Skip to main content

Very Short Introduction to Humanism published

My Oxford University Press Very Short Introduction to Humanism was published on Thursday.


Congratulations. Just pre-ordered on Not available in Canada until the end of February. Estimated delivery March 2, 2011. Hate to wait that long because I would like to submit a review to Free Inquiry.
Fergus Gallagher said…
Suggest add a direct (Amazon?) link.
Stephen Law said…
I thought I had, Fergus. Can't you see it?
Unknown said…
Excellent Stephen, this will be another great read as your other books. Ordering it now.
Paul P. Mealing said…
Just checked it out on Amazon UK, where I procure most of my reading in science and philosophy.

Will probably order it when I've finished my current one, Why Beliefs Matter; Reflections on the Nature of Science by E. Brian Davies, Professor of Mathematics at King's College, London. More than half way through and a very stimulating read.

Regards, Paul.
Anonymous said…

The link is both visible and works from Norway.

In Cod we trust
Tim Stephenson said…
Stephen, I have begun your new book. Firstly, most of us who who "organize under the banner of Humanism" have used the capital H for some time. I assume you adopted the small h for a reason? (maybe you explain this later in the book).
Tim Stephenson said…
What is the difference between a "non-natural mathematics" and a "natural mathematics". Surely all Humanists are committed to some form of pluralistic naturalism.

Popular posts from this blog


(Published in Faith and Philosophy 2011. Volume 28, Issue 2, April 2011. Stephen Law. Pages 129-151) EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS Stephen Law Abstract The vast majority of Biblical historians believe there is evidence sufficient to place Jesus’ existence beyond reasonable doubt. Many believe the New Testament documents alone suffice firmly to establish Jesus as an actual, historical figure. I question these views. In particular, I argue (i) that the three most popular criteria by which various non-miraculous New Testament claims made about Jesus are supposedly corroborated are not sufficient, either singly or jointly, to place his existence beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) that a prima facie plausible principle concerning how evidence should be assessed – a principle I call the contamination principle – entails that, given the large proportion of uncorroborated miracle claims made about Jesus in the New Testament documents, we should, in the absence of indepen

What is Humanism?

What is Humanism? “Humanism” is a word that has had and continues to have a number of meanings. The focus here is on kind of atheistic world-view espoused by those who organize and campaign under that banner in the UK and abroad. We should acknowledge that there remain other uses of term. In one of the loosest senses of the expression, a “Humanist” is someone whose world-view gives special importance to human concerns, values and dignity. If that is what a Humanist is, then of course most of us qualify as Humanists, including many religious theists. But the fact remains that, around the world, those who organize under the label “Humanism” tend to sign up to a narrower, atheistic view. What does Humanism, understood in this narrower way, involve? The boundaries of the concept remain somewhat vague and ambiguous. However, most of those who organize under the banner of Humanism would accept the following minimal seven-point characterization of their world-view.

Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism refuted

Here's my central criticism of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). It's novel and was published in Analysis last year. Here's the gist. Plantinga argues that if naturalism and evolution are true, then semantic epiphenomenalism is very probably true - that's to say, the content of our beliefs does not causally impinge on our behaviour. And if semantic properties such as having such-and-such content or being true cannot causally impinge on behaviour, then they cannot be selected for by unguided evolution. Plantinga's argument requires, crucially, that there be no conceptual links between belief content and behaviour of a sort that it's actually very plausible to suppose exist (note that to suppose there are such conceptual links is not necessarily to suppose that content can be exhaustively captured in terms of behaviour or functional role, etc. in the way logical behaviourists or functionalists suppose). It turns o