Stephen Law

Here . From American Spectator. Scruton laments the passing of his parents' style of humanism, and attacks the "new humanism" of Dawkins and the BHA. "Like so many modern ideologies, the new humanism seeks to define itself through what it is against rather than what it is for. It is for nothing, or at any rate for nothing in particular." The new humanism "seems to have no consciousness of what is clearly announced between the lines of the text [ON THE ATHEIST BUSES], namely that there are no ideals higher than pleasure." The BHA's "publications imply that there is only one thing that stands between man and his happiness, and that is the belief in God. " Bit of "straw man" going on here? I know many humanists but I am not sure I know of any that believe (i) "there are no ideals higher than pleasure" and (ii) "only one thing stands between man and his happiness, and that is the belief in God". I don't belie...

Following on from my post on Scruton below - this may answer some of your points and questions... Each year about five billion animals are slaughtered in the United States. They are killed to satisfy the American taste for their flesh. The vast majority of us consider this sort of treatment of other species morally acceptable (or at least nor particularly unacceptable). But is it? After all, we know, do we not, that animals suffer? They are also, to differing degrees, capable of enjoying pleasurable experiences as well. Why then are we morally permitted to treat the members of other species so very differently to our own? Singer’s challenge In his 1975 book Animal Liberation , Peter Singer presents us with precisely this challenge: to morally justify the way in which we discriminate between our own species and others. His conclusion, shocking to many, is that this discrimination cannot, in fact, be morally justified. Indeed, Singer believes that the vast majority of human beings are c...

Scruton's justification for discrimination against other species Roger Scruton attempts to justify our discriminating between pigs etc. and similarly dim humans by appealing to both potential and normality: It is in the nature of human beings that, in normal conditions, they become members of a moral community, governed by duty and protected by rights. Abnormality in this respect does not cancel membership. It merely compels us to adjust our response… It is not just that dogs and bears do not belong to the moral community. They have no potential for membership. They are not the kind of thing that can settle disputes, that can exert sovereignty over its life, that can respond to the call of duty or take responsibility on a matter of trust. Scruton, Roger (2000) Animal Rights and Wrongs , third edition (London, Metro), pp. 54-55. Scruton concludes that, because of these differences between pigs, etc. and similarly dim humans, we are morally justified in discriminating as we do (kill...