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Centre for Inquiry UK and South Place Ethical Society present



Keith Ward is a philosopher and theologian, Regius Professor of Divinity (Emeritus), Oxford, and the author of The God Conclusion.

Following up Darrell Ray’s talk The God Virus (Oct. 23) Ward’s talk addresses Richard Dawkins’s suggestion, developed by Ray, that religion functions in a similar way to a virus.

This is a free-standing talk. No familiarity with Ray’s book or talk will be assumed. Ward is a great guy, as well as one of the world's leading religious thinkers. There will be plenty of time for discussion. Please come!

Tues. November 30th, 2010, 7.30-9.00 pm

Conway Hall, 25 Red Lion Square, Holborn, London WC1R 4RL – Main Hall.

Just £4 on the door. Students £3.

Tickets on the door. To book in advance go to, hit button “support cfiuk” and follow instructions. Credit and debit cards welcome. Include names of those coming, phone number, return address, etc.


Martin said…
I've read and enjoyed quite a few of Dawkins' popular science books, but I cannot read Viruses of the Mind for cringing. It's just wrong to compare a physical entity such a viral infection to a non-physical thing which is a state of mind. By this I mean you can inspect the tissue of a living being and definitively say you have this or that virus, but you will never be able to say the same of a "virus of the mind".

I wonder if after 19 years Dawkins still promotes his parable, or whether it has rightly been demoted to the seemed like a good idea at the time pile.
Anonymous said…
I disagree with your statement that it's wrong to compare physical with non-physical, you CAN compare them. However I think it's not necessarily the God concept which is the virus but the religion.

Besides, the term "God" is so nebulous, to someone "God" is a being, to you it's a state of mind. So which is it?

Just a general question, is Keith Ward a Christian/religious person or is he a deist?

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