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Prejudice Blindness vs Prejudice Goggles

Both these things *can* be true:

1. Prejudice blindness. Not being the target of prejudice ourselves, we can easily miss it (so we should always listen).

2. Prejudice goggles. Considering ourselves or a minority a target, paranoia kicks in and we start 'seeing' prejudice where it isn't (and supposing those who can't see it must blind, or worse).

E.g. some say anti-black racism against Meghan Markle is a figment of the woke imagination (and her own). Others say it's real, and we should listen and take seriously: those who can't see it are ignorant or worse.

So which way do you lean on the following, and why?

Allegations of Islamophobia
Racism in the Metropolitan Police
Daily Mail coverage of immigration
Sarah Vine's suggestions that Meghan Markle is herself being racist against 'our culture' (by mocking curtsying to The Queen)
David Baddiel on treatment of Jewish people
Sexism in the workplace
Trans rights

I guess most of us lean in different directions on different issues. Melanie Philips thinks Islamophobia doesn't even exist. Some claim almost all accusations of prejudice are unfounded and indeed 'political correctness gone mad'. Others say that anyone who even questions whether self-identifying trans athletes in all sports is a good idea, or who thinks immigration is a problem, has already revealed themselves to be a bigot.


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