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My book The Philosophy Gym: 25 Short Adventures in Thinking


My book The Philosophy Gym: 25 Short Adventures in Thinking! Philip Pullman called it 'a vivid, enlightening introduction to clear thinking.'

'Where did the universe come from? Is time travel possible? Are genetically designed babies morally acceptable? If you have ever asked yourself such questions, then you have already begun to think philosophically. This book is for those who want to take the next step.

Teachers - LOTS of stuff in here relevant to the IB Theory of Knowledge, as well as A Level Religious Studies (God, personal identity, meta-ethics, etc.). Includes essays, dialogues. Sometimes irreverent!

On amazon.co.uk here.

On amazon.com here.

Comments

Paul P. Mealing said…
This book was my introduction to you. I read it while recovering from a prostatectomy in 2003.
I even wrote you a letter where I cheekily challenged one of your topics.
From memory, it was about how I don't know if someone else can think like me.
I pointed out that you obviously believe there are other people who can think like you, or you wouldn't have written the book.
And yes, you did reply to me.
It was also while recovering from that op that I finished my one and only published novel.
I think we have a common friend, Erroll Treslan, whom I 'met' on your blog. I've never met him in real life, but I value his friendship all the same.
I wish you all the best.
I subscribe to Philosophy Now (edited by Rick Lewis), which is an excellent British periodical. I read every article.
April 17, 2021 at 1:26 AM
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