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Book Zoom sessions with me for your RS or Philosophy class


 

TEACHERS. I'm offering online (via Zoom) talks and sessions to schools on A Level RS, Philosophy, and more.
 
ZOOM sessions can be organised to suit your exact class and needs, and can involve interaction, powerpoint slides, etc.
 
All sessions are accompanied by a pdf explaining the key points.
 
Sessions offered include:
· Ontological Arguments
· Natural Law and its practical application to e.g. embryo research and designer babies, abortion, assisted suicide, capital punishment, etc.
· The Kalam Cosmological Argument (incl. William Lane Craig)
· The Principle of Sufficient Reason
· Religious Experience (e.g. including Persiger and Dawkins)
· Religious Language: Ayer, Flew, Wittgenstein
· MetaEthics - especially emotivism and intuitionism
· The Logical and Evidential Problems of Evil (and my own Evil God Challenge)
 
Plus any other syllabus-related content you might want covered. I am happy to tailor sessions to your exact needs and syllabus.
 
All these sessions are interactive - I will take questions from pupils, and can include small group work and other activities within a session (to be agreed in advance with teacher).
 
I also offer mind-stretching sessions suitable for G&T that get pupils to think outside the box on issues such as the limits of science, naturalism, and the supernatural.
 
Cost is £220 for one hour, £380 for anything up to 5 hours.
 
If you would be interested in any of the above, do please get in touch.

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