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Oxford Literary Festival event with Prof Peter Atkins

This will be publicised shortly - March 2017, Oxford Lit Festival.

Can science answer every question? Is 'scientism' true? Is there not a place for philosophy, or theology, or some other ‘armchair’ discipline? Are science and religion ‘non-overlapping magisteria’ - with science focused on the age of rocks and religion the rock of ages, each unqualified to pronounce on the territory of the other? A philosopher and a scientist explore these questions.

Peter Atkins is Professor Emeritus of Chemistry at The University of Oxford, and has been called the Fifth Horseman of Atheism. Peter argues vigorously that science, and science alone, is capable of answering every legitimate question, and that disciplines such as philosophy and theology are a waste of time. Peter has said: that religious belief is 'outmoded and ridiculous’ and ‘I regard the teaching of religion as the purveying of lies’.

Stephen Law is Reader in Philosophy at Heythrop College, University of London, and the author of many popular introductions to philosophy including the Philosophy Gym and The Complete Philosophy Files (for children). He is also the author of OUP’s Very Short Introduction to Humanism. Stephen has debated a number of Christian thinkers including Profs William Lane Craig and John Lennox. He defends the role of armchair inquiry.


Anonymous said…
"Can science answer every question?"

Can it answer the above question?

Can it answer the above question?

Can it answer the above question?

Can it answer the above question?

Can it answer the above question?


And so on

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