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'Faith' and 'Hope' are vastly overrated

'Faith' and Hope' are feel-good words with a built-in warm, rosy glow. People who have faith and hope are held up for our admiration and emulation. We are encouraged to be like them - to believe and anticipate that, ultimately, all will be well.
 
Of course, faith can be good thing. It's good to have a little faith in those around us - to trust in others. Indeed, without at least some faith in your spouse, your bank manager, in other car drivers, and so on, modern life becomes impossible.
 
Hope, too, can be important  - without at least some hope of success we are unlikely to bother even trying.
 
Still, faith and hope are vastly overrated.... Continues here at CFI blogs.

Image courtesy wiki creative commons.

Comments

Paul P. Mealing said…
Many years ago, I read a book called Hope by Arnold Hutschnecker. The book was a fictionalised account of case-studies he had 'treated' as a psycho-therapist. But the gist of his discourse was that there are 2 types of hope, which he called active hope and passive hope. Active hope was having a goal and striving towards it and passive hope was 'waiting for your ship to come in' or believing in fate.

So I guess our irrational interest in horoscopes (and the like) feed our passive hope, as well as purchasing a Lotto (lottery) ticket every week. But hope in achieving goals, modest or otherwise is essential to psychological health. Suicide is often the consequence of losing hope at a fundamental level. We see it in refugee detention camps run by our (Australian) government. Taking away someone's hope can be the most damaging mental punishment one can inflict.

Not so sure about faith though. Faith in metaphysical entities (Deities) can be positive or negative, which suggests it depends more on the person than their Deity.

Regards, Paul.
June 25, 2016 at 3:57 AM
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