Notes on Ontological Argument from today's A2 Teachers First conference Bloomsbury (from ppt)
n Ontological argument
n Stephen Law
n Heythrop College, University of
London
n The ontological argument
n An argument that attempts to prove
the existence of God a priori, from the definition or concept of God.
n An “armchair” proof!
n Ontological argument
n Almost everyone thinks there is something
wrong with the argument.
n The question is: precisely what
is wrong with it?
n We will look at versions from
Descartes and Anselm.
n Descartes’ version
n God is supremely perfect
n Existence is a perfection
n Therefore: God exists
n Descartes’ argument
n The idea seems to be that the
concept of God logically includes or entails the idea of perfection and
thus existence (cos existence is a perfection).
n So to claim God does not
exist is to contradict yourself.
n Like claiming there is a triangle
without three sides.
n Descartes’ argument
n We can know from the comfort of our
armchairs that all triangles have 3 sides…
n …So we can know from the comfort of
our armchairs that God exists!
n My Schmartian objection
n If this were acceptable, then surely we could
define anything into existence.
n Add to the concept of a Martian that
of existence to give the concept of a Shmartian.
n Schmartian objection
n Then we know from our armchairs that
Shmartians exist!
n To deny that Schmartians exist would
be to contradict yourself!
n Defending the argument
n Reply: Existence is not a merely arbitrary
addition to the list of God’s attributes, as it is in the Schmartian example. Perfection necessarily
includes existence. So we cannot subtract the concept of existence from that of
God as we can subtract it from the concept of a Schmartian.
n Counter: Is existence a perfection?
n Further objection
n Second objection. Gaunilo’s perfect island. If
existence is a perfection, then the concept of the perfect island must
include existence.
n Existence is not an arbitrary
addition. Yet the ontological proof of the existence of the perfect island
clearly also fails.
n Kant: Existence not predicate
n Existing is not a further property
possessed by a thing, as being red or being tall is.
n Kant’s argument: first imagine a pile of coins; now
imagine this pile existing.
n What you imagine is exactly the
same: you do not mentally “add” any
property in the second imagining that you leave out in the first.
n Kant’s objection
n But if existence is not a property
that can be included in ones idea of a thing, then it is not a property that
might be included in the concept of God.
n As the ontological argument requires
that it is such a property, the argument fails.
n St Anselm’s argument
n 1. God is a being than which nothing
greater can be conceived
n 2. I can conceive of such a being
n 3. It is greater to exist in reality
than merely in the imagination
n 4. Therefore the being of which I
conceive must exist in reality
n St. Anselm on “fools”
n It is a contradiction to
suppose that I conceive of a being greater than which cannot be conceived, and
also to suppose that this being exists only in my imagination.
n Thus someone who supposes this is “a fool”, says Anselm.
n Kant again
n Again, Kant’s objection is that
existence is being treated as if it could be included in ones concept or idea
of a thing.
n I.e. Anselm supposes that the idea
of God involves the idea of existence because if it did not it would not be the
idea of the greatest conceivable being.
n Is Kant right?
n Actually, I am not sure Kant is
right that the idea of existence cannot be built into an idea of a thing…
n BUT, in my view, Anselm’s argument
fails even if Kant is wrong…
n My worry about Anselm’s argument
n Suppose I define a wibble
thus:
n Something is a wibble iff. (if and
only if) it is: (i) red, (ii) spherical, (iii) weighs one ton, and (iv) smells
of fish.
n My worry
n Now suppose I define a wooble
thus:
n Something is a wooble iff. it is:
(i) red, (ii) spherical, (iii) weighs one ton, (iv) smells of fish, and (v)
exists.
n Wibbles and woobles
n I can conceive of a wibble.
n But can I conceive of a wooble?
n No. Not if there are no woobles!
n I might think I am conceiving
of a wooble, but if there are none, the most I can be conceiving of is a
wibble, as what I am conceiving of will not possess the further property of
existence (though I may think it does).
n Wibbles and woobles
n Similarly, if for something to be
God it must exist, then I cannot prove God exists by supposing that I can
conceive of him. For it may be that I only think I can conceive of him.
n If there is no God, then I cannot really
conceive of him (just as, if there are no woobles, then I cannot really
conceive of one).
n Anselm begs the question
n Anselm begs the question by
supposing he can conceive of God.
n In order to establish this, he would
need first to establish that God exists, which is what his argument is supposed
to establish. Therefore his argument is question-begging.
n This objection is in my The Great
Philosophers book (Anselm)
n No armchair proof
n The general consensus amongst
philosophers is that ontological
arguments do not work.
n Heythrop College
n Consider Heythrop College for BA
hons Philosophy (and joint degrees).
n Univ. London.
n Small & friendly.
n One-to-one tutorial system.
n I am admissions tutor.
Comments
Two quick questions. Firstly, if Kant is wrong about using existence as a predicate (which, as you suggest, he may well be) does Descartes' argument succeed? I think you may be right about rejecting Kant's objection (it seems to me that existence can be used as a predicate, although one that functions differently to others).
Secondly, doesn't Anselm attempt to start by defining God in "wibble" terms and then conclude he must be more of a "wooble"? Descartes argues that God must be a "wooble" form of a "wibble". Anselm argues that if God is defined in a certain way then we must conclude that such a being exists (ie. he adds the existence rather than starting with it).
Hope that makes some sense!
True IMO but statements like "there is a consensus among X's that p is false" are notoriously hard to establish.
Also true IMO that there is no consensus about why ontological arguments do not work. I once had a long and inconclusive argument with a set theorist about whether mathematical sets exist. His argument was on the same lines: without sets, we have no mathematics, we can conceive of mathematics, ergo sets exist.
Likewise, the negative existential statement "it is not the case that for some x, x is an existing F and x does not exist" is true. But this (since it is a negative existential) only proves that non-existing Fs do not exist, not that some existing F exists.
“Kant’s argument: first imagine a pile of coins; now imagine this pile existing.” I understand the second part, i.e. imagining that for some x, x is a pile of coins. I’m not getting the first part. What is the difference between imagining a pile of coins and entertaining the proposition “some x, x is a pile of coins”? Can we imagine anything other than a proposition, and if we can’t, doesn’t the proposition have to be existential? So there is no difference between the first and the second imagination. But this is not what Kant appears to be saying. He appears to accept that there can be non-propositional imaginings, i.e. as well as imagining that an A is B, we can just imagine an A, and then he claims that there is no difference between imagining an A, and imagining an existing A. So his argument has psychological, rather than logical grounds.
But I question whether we can simply imagine an A. We can only imagine or entertain that some A is B, or C, or D, i.e. imagine or entertain some proposition. And if that’s the case, it follows by logic that there is no difference between imagining that some A is B, and imagining that some existing A is B. “Some buttercups are blue” means the same as “blue buttercups exist”.
Perhaps my claim that we cannot imagine except through some proposition is a psychological claim? Not sure.
The wibble wobble model essentially boils down to this:
Is it possible for the human mind to think what is unthinkable?
I mean, scientifically it has been demonstrated that chimps do in fact think...
What is interesting here though is to ask the question:
Can a chimp think about quantum physics?
Quantum physics appears to exist in the world and yet a chimp would not be able to think about it.
Isn't this state of affairs with the chimp similar to the your wibble wobble model?
The LHC has pretty much destroyed the idea of supersymmetry...now, supersymmetry is essentially based on the ability to measure something, i.e. if we can't measure a physical thing we can't explain the existence of the universe.
Several theories other than supersymmetry exist...one interesting one that is pertainent to the ontological argument is the "Dimensional Transmutation" theory....in this model model...mass say, is not measured (it can't be) but is instead simply calculated using numbers like "pi" and nothing else.
I kinda like this theory because if one draws a grid of vertical and horizontal lines on a sheet of paper and tosses a needle say, onto the grid the average number of lines on the grid the needle crosses approaches pi....for examlpe...ten tosses gives one 3.15...
You can do this experiment yourself...
This would tend to leave open the idea that an ontological argument "could" work.
I know we can debate whether "existing" is an attribute or not, but if it is, it probably isn't subjective. Therefore the wibble to which no greater wibble is would not be the wooble, but the transendent wibble which does exist. However, the wibble for which all of its attributes transend that which is greatest would mean that the wibble is the same as God. That wibble would have to be unity, of course, so to be the same as God means that we have proven God does exist and all we have done is to have changed the name from God to wibble.
I can think up God
From my experience of things that are "round" I can think of circle
a perfect form or mathematical model
of the real world
Man's need:
I am in the real (physical) world and it can make me despondent (natural disasters, death, loss,
pain, suffering,greed ,violence,enslavement of various kinds including drugs..)
I need very strongly an antidote to this.
we refer to hope and other mechanisms to give us power over despondency.God is one that seems to work.Homeopathy works on average for 3 weeks it seems.
Being in love lasts around 2 years.
as einstein said the problem is solved at a different level to the problem.
so create an abstract or metaphysical entity and endow it with all power goodness etc and you have solved the problem of despondency created by the physical world.
this may not work for mental illness such as depression as it is seems to be a problem in the abstract world too or at least is not amenable to reason.
I can think up God
From my experience of things that are "round" I can think of circle
a perfect form or mathematical model
of the real world
Man's need:
I am in the real (physical) world and it can make me despondent (natural disasters, death, loss,
pain, suffering,greed ,violence,enslavement of various kinds including drugs..)
I need very strongly an antidote to this.
we refer to hope and other mechanisms to give us power over despondency.God is one that seems to work.Homeopathy works on average for 3 weeks it seems.
Being in love lasts around 2 years.
as einstein said the problem is solved at a different level to the problem.
so create an abstract or metaphysical entity and endow it with all power goodness etc and you have solved the problem of despondency created by the physical world.
this may not work for mental illness such as depression as it is seems to be a problem in the abstract world too or at least is not amenable to reason.
I can think up God
From my experience of things that are "round" I can think of circle
a perfect form or mathematical model
of the real world
Man's need:
I am in the real (physical) world and it can make me despondent (natural disasters, death, loss,
pain, suffering,greed ,violence,enslavement of various kinds including drugs..)
I need very strongly an antidote to this.
we refer to hope and other mechanisms to give us power over despondency.God is one that seems to work.Homeopathy works on average for 3 weeks it seems.
Being in love lasts around 2 years.
as einstein said the problem is solved at a different level to the problem.
so create an abstract or metaphysical entity and endow it with all power goodness etc and you have solved the problem of despondency created by the physical world.
this may not work for mental illness such as depression as it is seems to be a problem in the abstract world too or at least is not amenable to reason.