Notes from today's lecture on evil and sufering.
n Problem of Evil
n Stephen Law
n The lecture
n What are we going to do?
n 1. Outline the problems of evil
(logical and evidential).
n 2. Outline and assess the “free will” solutions to evidential problem offered by (I)
Irenaeus and (II) Augustine.
n 3. Introduce “sceptical theism”.
n Prelim: natural and moral evils.
n (1): logical problem of evil
n (1) There is an all-powerful,
all-knowing, and all-good God.
n (2) There is evil.
n The logical problem of evil says (1)
and (2) are logically inconsistent.
n To assert both (1) and (2) is to
produce a logical contradiction (like saying that there are round
squares, or married bachelors).
n Dealing with the logical problem
n Reply. (1) and (2) are not logically
inconsistent as they stand.
n Some important goods require evils
(e.g. sympathy requires suffering).
n God will introduce or allow a
limited amount of evil if there is good reason to (i.e. a greater good).
n (2) the evidential problem
n 1. Gratuitous evil exists.
n 2. If God exists, gratuitous evil
does not exist
n Conclusion: God does not exist.
n Gratuitous evil = evil for which no
God-justifying reason.
n The evidential problem of evil
(cont.)
n The evidential problem of evil looks
like a powerful argument against the existence of God. Surely there is not just
evil, but gratuitous evil?
n Yes God made “all things bright and beautiful”. But let’s not forget about things like…
n Augustine’s theodicy
n God made Adam and Eve and gave them
freewill. Genesis 3 describes “the Fall” in the
garden of Eden.
n Adam and Eve chose to disobey God,
to do evil.
n This brought about “disharmony” in both human nature and creation (hence
natural evil).
n We share in the evil nature brought about by
Adam and Eve because we were “seminally”
present in them at the Fall. So we, too, deserve to suffer.
n Augustine’s theodicy (cont.)
n Note Augustine tries to explain both
natural and moral evil:
n (i) Natural evil is brought about by
the corruption of nature caused by the Fall. Earthquakes, cancer, etc. are not
God’s fault, but ours
(in other words it’s really moral evil after all).
n (ii) Moral evil is a result of our
own free choices – Adam and Eve’s, and now our own.
n Augustine’s theodicy (cont.)
n So, it is not unjust that we suffer
because we brought it upon ourselves. God could have prevented this suffering
but only by denying us freewill, which is a greater good.
n So the world is, on balance, better
than it would have been without free will, despite these evil consequences.
n Problems
n We now know there was no Adam and
Eve.
n Reply: But perhaps we might view the
Eden story as a myth that tells us something about human nature? It’s an
analogy or metaphor. It is not to be taken literally.
n Problems
n There has been human death, pain and
suffering for 200,000 years (e.g. childhood mortality rates).
n There was hundreds of millions of
years of non-human death, pain and suffering before humans appeared.
n Tectonic plate movements happen
anyway whether or not we sin (causing suffering).
n This is all inexplicable on
Augustine’s theodicy (whether or not taken literally).
n Problem
n Even if universe is 6k years old and
we are descended from Adam and Eve, why is it just for God to give our children
awful diseases because of something our distant (non-existent) ancestors did?
n We don’t normally consider
culpability/blameworthiness inheritable.
n So why suppose it is in this case?
n Irenaeus’s theodicy
n Suffering is necessary for a greater
good: the development and ennobling of human souls. The world is a “vale of soul-making” (John Hick).
n E.g. from suffering we learn
positive values. E.g. someone that has suffered a serious illness may afterwards
say how the learnt and grew through the experience.
n Criticism of Irenaeus’s theodicy
n Criticism: why could not God make us virtuous
to begin with?
n Why force us through an unnecessary
and often extremely nasty “test”?
n Hick reply: God doesn’t want “puppet
beings”.
n Further criticism of Irenaeus (2)
n The way in which natural evils are distributed
throughout the world seems inconsistent with the thought that the world has
been designed to develop our characters. Why does God reward mass murdering
dictators and give sweet vulnerable people horrendous diseases?
n It makes no sense!
n The secretive headmaster
n Suppose you come across a school…
n The secretive headmaster
n You observe that it has a strange
regime. The teachers horribly flog some children within an inch of their lives
for no reason whatever…
n The secretive headmaster
n Other pupils receive fantastic
rewards, again for no reason all. The headmaster knows everything that’s going on in the school. He knows
that many children leave physically and psychologically crippled. And he is in
complete control.
n What sort of headmaster runs this
school, do you think…?
n The secretive headmaster
n Is it reasonable to suppose
he is a highly benevolent person with the best interests of his pupils at
heart?
n The secretive headmaster
n Surely not. Pretty obviously, this
sort of regime is more likely to break the pupils’ characters them build them!
n But why is it reasonable to suppose the
world is run by an all-knowing, supremely benevolent headmaster?
n Comparing Irenaeus and Augustine
n Similarities:
n Both say: the evils we observe are
not gratuitous, for they are the price paid for greater goods.
n Unlike some other free-will
theodices, both aim to account not just for moral evils, but for natural
evils too.
n Comparing Irenaeus and Augustine
n Differences:
n Augustine: it is the exercise of
freewill in the past that is explanatorily important.
n Irenaeus: it is the exercise of free
will in the present and future that’s important (allow our future development).
n Augustine: our suffering is bound up
with judgement/just punishment.
n Irenaeus: our suffering is about development.
n Augustine makes all evil
moral evil; Irenaeus does not.
n Sceptical theism
n 1. Gratuitous evil exists.
n 2. If God exists, gratuitous evil
does not exist
n Conclusion: God does not exist.
n Michael Bergmann: We cannot know 1.
is true.
n The fact we can’t think of good
reasons for evils does not allow us to conclude there are none.
n Sceptical theism
n Chess Grandmaster analogy: fact the
novice cannot think of a reason why the Master made a move does not
justify novice in thinking there is no good reason.
n Sceptical Theism
n We are in a similar situation with
respect to God.
n Fact that can’t think of a
reason why God would allow an evil does not allow us to conclude there is
no good reason.
n Sceptical theism
n We shouldn’t expect to be
able to think of all the reasons there may be. C.f. Looking into a garage and
concluding no insects.
n Sceptical Theism
n The probability there are such
reasons is inscrutable to us. For all we know there are
good reasons for the evils.
n But then we can’t know there are any
gratuitous evils!
n But then the evidential argument
from evil fails!
Comments
Traditional moral psychology assigns a causal role to the non-intentional psychic pain, in motivating intentional action to end the distress. The view I'm proposing denies the traditional claim, because a generic pain with no conceptual content cannot be directed at an object, and hence cannot motivate intentional (as opposed to instinctive or reflex) action. So actions for which we can be held morally culpable cannot be caused by non-intentional states.
In a comment on another post in this blog (on William Lane Craig's remarks about animal pain from 18 March 2014), I mentioned the view that God experiences the suffering of all his creatures. Presumably (on such a view) God only experiences the non-intentional generic pain; because He cannot have evil intentional states such as envy, lust, or unrighteous anger and hatred.
On such a view, in what sense is there a traditional Problem of Evil? Some might reply "Even if God experiences my pain, surely I (as a person separate from God) also experience my own pain. Therefore, I can hold my pain against God, and blame Him for my suffering."
Who is the 'I' in that reply? Presumably, it is the chain of conceptual reasoning that rationalizes the pain as 'belonging' to it. If God is experiencing pain in the first-person through 'my' body, then God is the 'I'(I1) who experiences the non-intentional generic pain, but not the 'I' (I2) who has evil intentions accompanying the pain. In what sense does I2 have a claim to also be I1 alongside God? If I2 has no such claim, then there is no Problem of Evil, because God would be the only Self (as I1) who experiences pain, as a result of our evil intentions(as I2).
How can a chain of conceptual reasoning (that rationalizes itself to be a 'person') feel pain? Pain is not just a concept, but arguably 'personhood' is conceptual through-and-through. Some may reply "I am my body, and my body feels the pain", but most philosophers will say that's a literally false statement (or at least highly misleading). The more accurate description is "I feel pain THROUGH my body", so it follows that 'I' am not my body. A bundle of concepts held together by inferences cannot feel pain; though it can hate, envy, lust or covet (as conceptual content directed at an object). So whatever feels pain through our bodies has to be something other than a chain of reasoning, and is not itself a physical body. In so far as we are just one or both of those things, we are left out.
You ask for "proof" for Philolinguist's comments....
Well, if you Google "Rubber-Hand Experiments" and look at the results of these experiments with your "philosopher-hat" then you will find that what Philolinguist posits concerning the "I" is valid.