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Global Warming – Where Do We Go From Here? April 12th

CFI UK and Conway Hall present

Global Warming – Where Do We Go From Here?

Radical ideas ad suggestions on how to respond to the threat of global warming from some of the UK’s leading experts and campaigners.

Organized and presented by Stephen Law.

April 12th, 2014

Conway Hall
Red Lion Square
London WC1R 4RL
Near Holborn Tube

£10 (£5 students) free to friends of CFI UK.

Tickets available online at:

10.30 Registration

11am Dr Mayer Hillman. Senior Fellow Emeritus, Policy Studies Institute, London. What do we do now that society is demonstrating all too clearly its strong preference for downplaying the significance and implications of climate change?

12.00 Dr Rupert Read. Philosopher and Green activist. Rupert will speak about global over-heat, the end of denialism, and the self-destruction of libertarianism in relation to this issue - and a possible way forward, in terms of guardians for future people. (lunch)

1.45 Dr Vicky Pope. The Met Office. Vicky was a founding member of the Met Office Hadley Centre and is a member of the Advisory Board on the UNEP early warning project on climate related hazards. She will present an overview of the latest science from the IPCC report and talk about its relevance for the UK. Vicky will give some idea of weather extremes we might expect.

2.45 Saci Lloyd is an Ecological activist and internationally-acclaimed writer. She is the author of Carbon Diaries.

3.45 End

CFI UK reserves the right to change the programme.


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