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CFI UK Surveillance Society event May 3rd


Centre for Inquiry UK and Conway Hall present

The Surveillance Society

Including Caspar Bowden, Tom Sorell, Judith Rauhofer.

Post Snowden, where do we go now? When is surveillance acceptable, and when is it wrong? Should whole swathes of public policy regarding surveillance now be junked? Three leading experts in the field present accessible and fascinating talks on our emerging surveillance society – and what to do about it.

Organized and chaired by Stephen Law

Saturday May 3rd 2014

Conway Hall (Main Hall)
25 Red Lion Square
Holborn
London
WC1R 4RL
(Nr Holborn Tube)

£10 (£5 students) Free to friends of CFI UK.
10.30am registration. 11am – 3.45pm

Tickets available at https://humanism.org.uk/events/?page=CiviCRM&q=civicrm/event/info&reset=1&id=57

11.00 Caspar Bowden. Caspar Bowden is an independent advocate for information privacy rights, and public understanding of privacy research in computer science. For nine years he was Chief Privacy Adviser for Microsoft for forty countries.
12.00 Tom Sorell. Professor of Philosophy, University of Warwick. Tom will be talking about the relation between the power of an agent of surveillance and the prima facie wrongness of surveillance.
1.45 Judith Rauhofer. Is a lawyer and lecturer in IT law at the University of Edinburgh. She will be speaking about about surveillance and the rule of law, the different understandings of "lawfulness" and the concept of privacy as a common good.
2.45 Plenary.
3.45 END

CFI UK reserves the right to change the programme due to unforeseen circumstances.


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