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Book coming out end of the year (to which I contribute)

The Oxford Handbook of Atheism
[FINAL CONTENTS LIST]
Editors: Stephen Bullivant (St Mary’s University College)
and Michael Ruse (Florida State University)
Introduction: The Study of Atheism – Stephen Bullivant (St Mary’s) and Michael Ruse (Florida State)
Part 1: Definitions and Debates
                                    
1. Defining ‘Atheism’ – Stephen Bullivant (St Mary’s)
2. The Case against Atheism – T. J. Mawson (Oxford)
3. Critiques of Theistic Arguments – A. C. Grayling (Birkbeck)
4. Arguments for Atheism – Graham Oppy (Monash)
5. Problems of Evil – Michael L. Peterson (Asbury)
6. Atheism and Morality – Erik J. Wielenberg (DePauw)
7. Atheism and the Meaningfulness of Life – Kimberly A. Blessing (Buffalo State)
8. Aquinas and Atheism – Brian Davies (Fordham)
Part 2: History of (Western) Atheism
9. The Pre-Socratics to the Hellenistic Age – David Sedley (Cambridge)
10. The Roman Empire to the End of the First Millennium – Mark Edwards (Oxford)
11. The Medieval Period – Dorothea Weltecke (Konstanz)
12. Renaissance and Reformation – Denis Robichaud (Notre Dame)
13. The Age of Enlightenment – Alan C. Kors (Pennsylvania)
14. The Nineteenth Century – David Nash (Oxford Brookes)
15. The Twentieth Century – Callum Brown (Dundee)
16. New Atheism – Thomas Zenk (Berlin Free)
Part 3: Worldviews and Systems
17. Humanism – Stephen Law (Heythrop)
18. Existentialism – Alison Stone (Lancaster)
19. Marxism – Peter Thompson (Sheffield)
20. Analytic Philosophy – Charles Pigden (Otago)
21. Jewish Atheism – Jacques Berlinerblau (Georgetown)
22. Buddhism – Andrew Skilton (SOAS)
23. Jainism – Anne Vallely (Ottawa)
24. Hinduism – Jessica Frazier (Kent)
Part 4: Atheism and the Natural Sciences
25. Naturalism and the Scientific Method – Michael Ruse (Florida State)
26. Atheism and the Rise of Science – Taner Edis (Truman)
27. Atheism and Darwinism) – David P. Barash (Washington)
28. Atheism and the Physical Sciences – Victor J. Stenger (Colorado)
Part 5: Atheism and the Social Sciences
29. Atheism and the Secularization Thesis – Frank L. Pasquale and Barry A. Kosmin (ISSSC)
30. Psychology of Atheism –Miguel Farias (Oxford)
31. Atheism and Cognitive Science – Jonathan Lanman (Oxford)
32. Atheism and Societal Health – Phil Zuckerman (Pitzer)
33. Atheism, Gender, and Sexuality – Melanie A. Brewster (Columbia)
34. Atheism, Health and Well-being – Karen Hwang (Center for Atheist Research)
35. Conversion and Deconversion – Ralph W. Hood and Zhuo Chen (Tennessee)
Part 6: Global Expressions
36. A World of Atheism: Global Demographics – Ariela Keysar (Trinity) and Juhem Navarra-Rivera (Connecticut)
37. Western Europe – Lois Lee (Cambridge)
38. North America – Ryan T. Cragun (Tampa), Joseph H. Hammer (Iowa State), Jesse M. Smith (Colorado)
39. Central and Eastern Europe – Irena Borowik (Jagiellonian), Branko Ančić (Institute for Social Research), Radosław Tyrała (AGH)
40. Islamic World  – Samuli Schielke (ZMO, Berlin)
41. India – Johannes Quack (Heidelberg)
42. Japan – Sarah Whylly (Florida State)
Part 7: Atheism and the Arts
43. Literature – Bernard Schweizer (Long Island)
44.Visual Arts  – J. Sage Elwell (TCU)
45.Music  – Paul Bertagnolli (Houston)
46.Film – Nina Power (Roehampton)

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