"Atheists reject Christianity not because it is unreasonable, but because they don’t want it, or theism more generally, to be true"
Here is one of four answers regularly offered by Christians
(and others) for the failure of atheists to recognize the reasonableness of Christian
belief (the other three, as well as a continuation of this one, will be blogged later). Edward Feser gets special mention:
(i) Atheists reject Christianity not because it is
unreasonable, but because they don’t want it, or theism more generally,
to be true.
Those attempting to explain atheist non-belief as a product of wishful
thinking sometimes quote atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel, who in his book The Last Word, says:
It isn’t
just that I don’t believe in God, and naturally, hope there is no God. I don’t
want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that.[i]
But is this the view of most atheists? Surely the Christian message is
one of hope. It provides numerous attractive reassurances, especially about
death and justice. In particular, it promises that we can be reunited with our
dead loved ones beyond the grave, that we and they can live in joy forever, and
that people will ultimately get their just deserts. These are appealing beliefs
for most of us.
Indeed, that Christianity is not, as a rule, the sort of thing people want
to be true is fairly obviously contradicted by the manner in which Christians
tend to promote it. They often place at least as much emphasis on how wonderful
it would be if Christianity were true as on any intellectual case that might be
made in its support.
Wishful-thinking-based explanations for the failure of individuals to
appreciate the reasonableness of Christian belief also run into trouble with
those tortured individuals who struggle valiantly to keep their faith but lose
it nonetheless. Their rejection of Christianity does not appear to be motivated
by wishful thinking. Quite the opposite.
Atheists don’t want to believe in eternal damnation
But perhaps we have overlooked the less attractive thoughts involved in
Christianity, thoughts that might yet motivate an irrational rejection? In his
book The Last Superstition, the Christian
philosopher Edward Feser quotes Nagel in support of his view that many secular
intellectuals reject religion because they don’t want it to be true. Feser adds:
Atheism,
like religion, can often rest more on a will to believe than on dispassionate
rational arguments. Indeed, as the philosopher C.F.J. Martin has pointed
out, the element of divine punishment – traditionally understood in the
monotheistic religions as a sentence of eternal damnation in Hell – shows that
atheism is hardly less plausibly motivated by wishful thinking than theism
is. For while it is hard to understand why someone would want to believe
that he is in danger of everlasting hellfire, it is not at all hard to see why
one would desperately want not to believe this.[ii]
On Feser’s view, the presence of this unappealing thought in
Christianity shows that people are as likely to disbelieve Christianity as a
result of wishful thinking as they are to believe.
It may be true, as a general rule, that the fact that a thought is
unappealing makes it less likely it will be believed. However, there is an
obvious exception to this rule. The exception is when the unappealing thought takes
the form of a threat: believe or else.
I once received an email chain message claiming that if I forwarded the
message to two friends I would receive good fortune, but if I failed to forward
the message I would be cursed with bad luck. The appealing thought that I would
receive good luck if I did as instructed was obviously intended to incentivize
action. But then so too was the unappealing thought of bad luck if I didn’t. The
email waved both a carrot and a stick at me, the stick providing me with at
least as much incentive as the carrot.
A recipient of the traditional Christian message is presented with an infinitely
more impressive carrot and stick. The carrot includes a promise of everlasting
life for those who truly believe; the stick involves the threat of eternal
damnation for those who don’t.
Feser is correct that an atheist like
Nagel won’t want it to be true that hell
awaits those who fail to believe. But then neither do I want it to be true that, as a result of my failing to forward that email
message, I will receive bad luck. It does not follow, in either case, that the
unpleasant character of the threat functions, on balance, as a disincentive – making it less likely the message’s recipient will do as they are instructed
(believe the Christian message; forward the chain email).
On the contrary, the inclusion of
such threats makes it more likely the recipient will do as instructed, not less.
I binned that email message not because of the unappealing threat that it
contained, but despite the unappealing threat it contained. Feser is mistaken: those
who fail to believe the Christian message do so not because of threats of eternal
damnation, but despite them.
There is a further weakness to this particular diagnosis of why it is
that atheists fail to recognize the reasonableness of theism or Christianity. A
great many Christians, including theologically sophisticated Christians, reject
the doctrine of eternal damnation. So, even if the unpleasantness of the
thought of eternal damnation did have the off-putting effect Feser claims, it
would only put people off those varieties of Christian or theistic belief that involved
the doctrine. Assuming the atheist recognizes that they can embrace theism
without embracing the doctrine of eternal damnation, why should that
unappealing character of the latter doctrine should put them off theism per se?
To conclude: (i) it would appear
that the unappealing character of the thought of eternal damnation functions,
on balance, not to disincentivize Christian belief, but to incentivize it, and (ii)
in any case, belief in theism does not require one to believe in eternal
damnation, so [even setting aside (i)], the unappealing
character of the thought of eternal damnation does not, as it stands, provide a
very convincing explanation for the (as Feser sees it) atheist’s irrational
rejection of theism.
Comments
I don't think he's saying this the way theists think he is, when they quote him in support of their point.
I think what he's saying is that, in light of all of the advances in understanding science has given us, it would be a huge anticlimax if it turned out to have been blinked into existence by a magician.
That's what I mean if I say I don't want the universe to be like that. I want the universe to be what it seems to be, a mind-numbingly old and unfathomably huge place that operates under a very specific set of rules that came about naturally.
I like the rest of it, though. :-)
I also question the extent to which Feser might be separating the rational from emotional cogitation. I vaguely recall work done by the neurologist Antonio Demasio on victims of prefrontal cortical trauma. Many of these victims were extremely rational but could not function in society because they could not make basic decisions. You could take them carefully through every logical step to weigh the pros and cons of, say, going to see a movie. Despite the patient’s rigorous evaluation, they lacked the emotional valence to render a final decision. The problem was that these patients were so coldly rational and objective that they were functionally paralyzed.
Would Feser criticize someone who flees an abusive relationship as one who is simply making a irrational, emotionally motivated decision not to suffer abuse? No doubt, a healthy emotional IQ is required to respond appropriately to an abusive situation, but is that a legitimate criticism? If someone suffering from battered person syndrome chooses not to respond emotionally to an abuser, is this person reacting in a way any normal person would call rational? I agree with Evan Fales that any morally decent person has an ethical obligation to reject and censure the god of the xian bible, if it in fact exists.
Regarding those flavors of xianity that advertise eternal hellfire, I agree that this dogma would not emotionally disincentivize an atheist from belief in the xian god. If a fundamentalist can convince me that I am in fact totally depraved and worthy of this eternal punishment as a consequence of the judicious, measured conclusions a perfectly just being, then I ought to accept this judgment without objection. If I value justice & fairness, then I should honorably accept my just punishment & not immorally seek to cheat the system. An honest, decent person would rather spend eternity in the company of fellow humans justly serving the sentences they earned than in the company of those who unjustly & immorally cheated the system & are enjoying the fruits of an afterlife that they did not earn. If I wake from a psychotic break to discover I had engaged in mass murder, I should willingly accept just punishment & not seek a scapegoat. Xian soteriology is morally bankrupt.
Secondly, he is confused when mentioning Hell. True, not wanting to believe in Hell is a good motivator of religious unbelief. But since religions generally threaten Hell to unbelievers, it cuts both ways: the fear of damnation for unbelief is a motivator of belief.
In fact, this is a pretty good tool for establishing whether one's belief is grounded in will or reason. It only makes sense to accuse me of a will not to believe if my rational instincts otherwise point to belief. But that would mean I am making myself deny a Hell I think is probably true - and therefore damning myself. One would only disbelieve Hell if one thinks there is no cost (damnation-wise) in doing so. Which means that atheists, unlike Christians, are clearly guided by reason and not will, or faith.
Atheists don't want people who disagree with them to burn in Hell.
Or else they would become Christians.
Twin studies have revealed that a belief in God seems to have a genetic connection, and that explains, I believe, why religion will always be a part of human culture. It's only extreme religious belief that creates its counterpart: militant atheism; otherwise it would not be an issue, and ideally it shouldn’t be in a secular society.
Regards, Paul.
Your analogy comparing the warning of damnation to threats in spam email, while a poor analogy, is helpful to the discussion. The reason is that your analogy points to the importance of the credibility of the warning. Email threats have no credibility and so I never, ever forward those threats. I may like the content of the email and want to forward it to friends who I think would appreciate the beauty of the pictures or whatever it is, but the threat itself is so offputting that I generally trashed the entire email. I confess that on occasion I have forwarded the email after redacting the threat, but only on rare occasions. On the other hand, a credible warning is something ever reasonable person would want to hear and to heed. For example, if I knew the bridge was out around the corner I would want flag down any approaching cars to prevent them from going into the ravine. Reasonable people would be likely to heed and be thankful for the warning. Such is the warning of coming damnation. Contrary to the view of one person expressed above, Christians do not relish the thought of seeing people who disagree with them go to hell. Christians, like myself, are seeking to provide a service. We are standing in the highway trying to flag down cars. We don't want people to drive off the cliff and we don't understand why people call us names as they drive past.
My point is that it is impossible to prove that God and hell do not exist. And because the stakes are high (eternity is a long time), most reasonable people will consider the warning of eternal damnation as something that should be seriously considered. This is the reason it is an incentive to belief for most people.