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Speaker needed

I am looking for a theologian, probably, to participate in an event on scientism, non-overlapping magesteria, etc. on June 8th, with Peter Atkins and philosopher David Papineau. Any suggestions? A woman contributor would be especially welcome given it's all guys at the moment.

Comments

Landon Hedrick said…
Nancey Murphy would be a good choice.
linford86 said…
I don't know of any female theologians who work on this topic, but John Haught comes to mind as someone who defends a view like that.
daz365 said…
http://www.wycliffehall.org.uk/sharon-dirckx

Sharon Dirckx was on unbelievable with justin brierley a few weeks ago. she has a science background and has written a book: “Why? God, Evil and Personal Suffering”.
Louys David said…
I would suggest the catholoic theologian Lorenzo Albacete, who debated with Christopher Hitchens once : http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZTbLuw2AV0

He is a member of the movement Communion and Liberation, founded by Luigi Giussani, a movement which insists on applying christian values in everyday life.

The reason why I think he would be an interesting speaker is that he seems to totally accepts scientific facts but claims to believe in god in the same way as when you fall in love with a person your friends can't bear. You hear the evidence they bring out but it doesn't diminish your love for the person. I think that you could show how this type of argument is spurious.

However, Mr.Albacete is american, so I guess there might be practical reasons making his presence at your event problematic.

I still wanted to mention him though, maybe for another time, and because he is a sophisticated theologian whose ability to square faith with scientific scepticism is interesting/annoying.

Louys David said…
I add that Mr. Albacete has a scientific background, and that he genuinely questioned his faith when asked "how can you be a scientist from monday to saturday and believe that someone raised from the dead on sunday?". That might be the opportunity for him to lay out his answer to that question.
Annie Jane said…
Francesca Stavrakopoulou! She's a theologian at Exeter and did the BBC documentary 'Bible's hidden secrets' - she came to Think Week and was an awesome speaker!
IMHO, Dirckx's performance on Unbelievable? was unbelievably poor.
Helen De Cruz said…
Sarah Coakley is not far geographically. Or, internationally, Celia Deanne-Drummond (Notre Dame). Both have done interesting work on science and religion.
Anonymous said…
I agree that Sharon Dirckx was very poor during the discussion about the problem of evil on 'Unbelievable' whereas Alom Shaha, her 'opponent' was more focussed and rational. If you want to 'win' (I know that what you really want is to explore the issue) I think that you should choose her.
Anonymous said…
This comment has been removed by the author.
Joe Sen said…
I'll do this talk against the scientists for spiritual philosophy.

Contact: josephchandrasen@gmail.com
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