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Podcast interview with Kylie Sturgess

January 11th – 365 Days Of Philosophy Podcast – An Interview With Stephen Law



January podcast Stephen Law The interview for January is with Stephen Law.

http://365daysofphilosophy.libsyn.com/rss

Download audio here: January – Interview With Stephen Law
Stephen Law (BA, BPhil, DPhil) is a philosopher and senior lecturer at Heythrop College in the University of London. He also edits the philosophical journal Think, which is published by the Royal Institute of Philosophy and aimed at the general public.

Professor Law is the author of a number of books, including The Philosophy Files, The Outer Limits, A Very Short Introduction To Humanism, The War For Children’s Minds and Believing Bullshit. He is also the Provost for the Centre for Inquiry, UK. He blogs at Stephen Law and Believing Bullshit, and uses Twitter at https://twitter.com/stephenlaw60.

For this interview, I opened with a question that my students always had about his career – how and why did he get into philosophy in the first place (particularly as an adult student at the age of 24)? We discuss humanism, atheism, debates about the existence of god, philosophy for all ages - and, of course (as it is Week Two), arguments… and how do you know when is it worth arguing in the first place?

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