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Event (arranged by myself) tomorrow with Chris French, Andy Lewis, etc. - see some of you there I hope

CFI UK and Conway Hall present

HEALING POWERS OF THE MIND?

Chris French, Andy Lewis, Mike Heap, Serena Roney-Dougal

Do some people have the power to heal others by psychic means? Would medicine benefit by being more aware of our “spiritual” dimension? Where do psychic and spiritual approaches to medicine end and quackery begin? Does hypnosis work, and if so, how? Does meditation offer real benefits – and if so, what are they?

Saturday, 20th October 2012

Conway Hall
25 Red Lion Square
London WC1R 4RL

11am-4pm (10.30am registration)

£10 (£5 students concessions). Free entry for Friends of CFI UK.

Tickets from the BHA website now or on the door.

Speakers:

11am-12.00 Chris French (Professor of Anomolistic Psychology at Goldsmiths) on psychic healing

12.00-1pm Serena Roney-Dougal (parapsychologist and Director of the Psi Research Centre) "Is long-term meditation related to psychic awareness?"

2-3pm Michael Heap (Clinical and forensic psychologist working in Sheffield who has published widely on hypnosis in scientific journals and books and has taught and lectured on the subject throughout Europe and North America.) ‘Hypnosis: Suggestion or Trance?’ 

3-4pm Andy Lewis (Quackometer) on “Anthroposophy and Spiritual Science”.


Introduced by Stephen Law (Provost of CFI UK)

Image.

Comments

Mark Jones said…
Thanks for this event, Stephen. Excellent talks by Chris French, Mike Heap and Andy Lewis. Obviously Serena Roney-Dougal wasn't quite on the same wavelength as the humanists in the room, but it was still fascinating to hear about her life with the monks!

Following Andy's talk, I've blogged about Steinerism, which is a worrying development in the free school initiative.
Stephen Law said…
Thanks Mark I will check out your blog...

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