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Philosophy Prize - results

Philosophy Essay Prize Competition 2012 

Heythrop College offers its congratulations to Steven Robinson from The John Henry Newman School the Winner of the Heythrop Essay Prize Competition 2012

The award panel also noted the high standard of the entries and extends congratulations to those entrants who achieved a distinction or merit. 

Heythrop College will send your award to your school/college, advising them of your success.

Winner
Steven Robinson
The John Henry Newman School

Runner-Up
Max Dalton
Richmond School
Distinction
Colin Bunkum
Liskeard School and Community College
Elliott Handley
City of Stoke-on-Trent Sixth Form College
Issie Hollands
Rugby School
Torben Schwartz
City of Stoke-on-Trent Sixth Form College
Jack Wearing
City of London School

Merit
Alexander Bates
Woodbridge High School
Daniel Hogg
Royal Grammar School, Newcastle
Zachary John
The Priory Academy LSST
Heledd Joyner
Penglais School
Thomas Lindsey-Turner
Exeter College
Samuel Martin
Our Lady of Sion School
Parris Sammut
Maidstone Grammar School
Lucy Spoliar
City of London School for Girls
Janaki Sri Kantha
Wimbledon High School

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