Skip to main content

Philosophy graduates are pretty darn smart

Many thanks to ShahHusseinKCL for this chart. Controversial obviously, but look where philosophy is placed. This chart draws on diagrams that I previously posted here.


Comments

I'm feeling even more smug (guess what I studied).
Alex said…
Hi! I am trying to locate one of your earlier, and related, posts in which you argumented (with data and links) that studying philosophy was a really good choice and a great predictor of professional success in life... Can somebody help me find that post? Thx.
Paul S. Jenkins said…
I studied architecture, so I'm slap bang in the middle. (So maybe I should keep quiet...)
Unknown said…
Oh. It never occurred to me that this might be controversial. errm... oops?

@Alex -- Surely, you just want the page pointed to by the "here" hyperlink at the end of the above post? Since you're asking, I think you might find this video interesting too.

Also, if anyone is interested in how I calculated this then read my original post. But be warned, there's a (tiny) little math involved.

To quote a friend who was reading my post "Oh, to be honest, I didn't read that. Just saw maths and then it was over..."
Stephen Law said…
Well it is controversial exactly what conclusions can be drawn from GRE scores. Tostemaihat's what I meant....
Unknown said…
Oh, I see. I thought you meant about how people get very angry every time someone plots IQ against some other variable.
Anonymous said…
Isn’t IQ something of a red herring? See Aboriginals and the Great Game tray test. Surely its what you do with what you’ve got that counts. Some members of Mensa seem to have difficulty tying shoelaces.
Apparently the RAF believe philosophy to be a desirable study for recruits. Perhaps when confronted with a brain that insists the ‘plane is straight and level. While instruments indicate a perilous attitude. Being able to appreciate that your mind might just be plain wrong, is advantageous.
Unknown said…
Actually, the more I look at this graph, the more irritated I get. I wish I had the full data so I could calculate error bars for each point.
Carbon Dated said…
Philosophers may be 'pretty darn' smart, but physicists are astronomically (ahem) smart. That gap between them and everybody else is Secretariat-winning-the-Belmont sized gap.
Anonymous said…
Carbon Dated said...
physicists are astronomically (ahem) smart.
They certainly need to be. As dark matter, force and space, appear leaps of intellect commensurate with devising a deity. Lets pray they pan out.
Unknown said…
Am I right that neither law or medicine are explicitly included? Surely these are amongst the most stereotypical careers for the brightest and hard-working kids?
Unknown said…
@Adzcliff -- I believe this is how the american system works:

MCAT -> Medical College
LSAT -> Law School
GMAT -> Management
GRE -> Every other graduate school.

That's why you don't see medicine or law.
Unknown said…
Aah, thanks ShahHussainKCL! Would be interested to see how medicine, law (and thinking about it veterinary science) feature in amongst all this. Of course I'm not suggesting this is your job - am off to see if Stephen's other links give any insights here...
Graduating with a degree can really make you smarter than ever. It is an edge to everyone because they know that you have finished and accomplished something. Great post. Thanks for sharing!

Popular posts from this blog

EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS

(Published in Faith and Philosophy 2011. Volume 28, Issue 2, April 2011. Stephen Law. Pages 129-151) EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS Stephen Law Abstract The vast majority of Biblical historians believe there is evidence sufficient to place Jesus’ existence beyond reasonable doubt. Many believe the New Testament documents alone suffice firmly to establish Jesus as an actual, historical figure. I question these views. In particular, I argue (i) that the three most popular criteria by which various non-miraculous New Testament claims made about Jesus are supposedly corroborated are not sufficient, either singly or jointly, to place his existence beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) that a prima facie plausible principle concerning how evidence should be assessed – a principle I call the contamination principle – entails that, given the large proportion of uncorroborated miracle claims made about Jesus in the New Testament documents, we should, in the absence of indepen

Aquinas on homosexuality

Thought I would try a bit of a draft out on the blog, for feedback. All comments gratefully received. No doubt I've got at least some details wrong re the Catholic Church's position... AQUINAS AND SEXUAL ETHICS Aquinas’s thinking remains hugely influential within the Catholic Church. In particular, his ideas concerning sexual ethics still heavily shape Church teaching. It is on these ideas that we focus here. In particular, I will look at Aquinas’s justification for morally condemning homosexual acts. When homosexuality is judged to be morally wrong, the justification offered is often that homosexuality is, in some sense, “unnatural”. Aquinas develops a sophisticated version of this sort of argument. The roots of the argument lie in thinking of Aristotle, whom Aquinas believes to be scientifically authoritative. Indeed, one of Aquinas’s over-arching aims was to show how Aristotle’s philosophical system is broadly compatible with Christian thought. I begin with a sketch of Arist

Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism refuted

Here's my central criticism of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). It's novel and was published in Analysis last year. Here's the gist. Plantinga argues that if naturalism and evolution are true, then semantic epiphenomenalism is very probably true - that's to say, the content of our beliefs does not causally impinge on our behaviour. And if semantic properties such as having such-and-such content or being true cannot causally impinge on behaviour, then they cannot be selected for by unguided evolution. Plantinga's argument requires, crucially, that there be no conceptual links between belief content and behaviour of a sort that it's actually very plausible to suppose exist (note that to suppose there are such conceptual links is not necessarily to suppose that content can be exhaustively captured in terms of behaviour or functional role, etc. in the way logical behaviourists or functionalists suppose). It turns o