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Talk on moral and religious education

There's a talk I gave as an avatar on moral and religious education available here. It is based on my book The War For Children's Minds. About 50 mins long. Obviously the book goes into more detail. This is merely a short taster...


Love the shot around 33:00 - "he actually looks like this"
Bernard Hurley said…
I don't think your ghost was holy but he did manage to talk without opening his mouth so he was fairly magical. But I do think he ought to have done something about the guy who was smoking!
Anonymous said…
So many observations, so little space.

An authoritarian believes that some external agent should dictate the operating parameters of an individual. Does that believer also accept, that it is I who should define those parametric delimiters? I once heard a mother, who had cracked it, talking to her offspring. She issued directives. But had taught her infant to respond with the simply beautiful query: “Because?”
Why not a simple set of universal “laws” that all religions, science, and even Asimov himself might subscribe to. The “Species Law” perhaps.
p.s. Richard is in the wrong station of your cross. Because he blanks questions that he has never asked of himself.
p.p.s. Next Big Question time. Please ask Nicky to back off the volume on the lady with hers cranked up to 11. (Shout, and they will better understand?)
Didem Naz said…
Trend Film izle Yeni çıkan yerli ve yabancı filmleri indirmeden online ve full izleyebileceğiniz sinema platformudur...

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