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Talking of blasphemy, Tim Minchin cut from tonight's J. Ross show

Tim Minchin's blog has very cross post about ITV's decision to cut his recorded appearance on the J Ross show tonite. Tim writes...

"And then someone got nervous and sent the tape to ITV’s director of television, Peter Fincham.

And Peter Fincham demanded that I be cut from the show.

He did this because he’s scared of the ranty, shit-stirring, right-wing press, and of the small minority of Brits who believe they have a right to go through life protected from anything that challenges them in any way."

Here's what was cut...


PS Tim's "I am not saying I'm Jesus" reminded me of king of the blasphemers (Jerry Springer musical case) Stewart Lee - go to 1min30.

I have sent my thoughts to viewerservices@itv.com Their explanation is: "We often make changes to programmes before transmission and on this occasion we felt that the song didn’t quite work editorially."

Comments

The Atheist Missionary said…
The Komodo dragon line is brilliant as, of course, is Minchin. For those who haven't already seen him live, make a point of it in 2012.
December 28, 2011 at 11:28 PM
Mike said…
Here's also one of his famous "If I didn't have you" song.

tim minchin song on cupidslibrary
October 5, 2012 at 9:43 AM
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