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debate tonight in Farnham, Surrey 8pm

farnham HUMANISTS

“Morality without religion has no firm foundation”.


1. The debate will take place on Tuesday 1st November at South Farnham School, Menin Way, Farnham, Surrey GU9 8DY at 7.45pm, (actual introduction and debate starts at 8.00pm), ending promptly at 10.00pm. We will arrange to collect you from the station or, if you prefer, we can send you some maps and directions.

2. The motion is “Morality without religion has no firm foundation”.

3. The motion will be proposed and seconded by Professor Lord Harries of Pentregarth and Dr Nabil Mustapha, Baha’i and Interfaith. It will be opposed by Dr Stephen Law, Provost, Centre for Enquiry and David Pollock, President of the European Humanist Federation. Each side will decide who will speak first and who second. Mrs Norma Corkish, head of Citizen’s Advice Waverley will chair the debate.

4. The debate will be opened by the Chairman of Farnham Humanists who will welcome and thank everyone, introduce the Debate Chairman and say that the debate will be followed by a collection for our charities (charities to be confirmed nearer the debate). The Debate Chairman will introduce the speakers.

5. Each of the four main speakers will be given up to 10 minutes to present their case. Following the four speakers, the debate will be opened to the floor where members of the public can air their views or ask questions for up to 3 minutes each. A small number of nominated people may be specifically invited to speak from the floor. The Chairman will seek to keep contributions for and against the motion equal as far as possible. Following the contributions from the floor the proposer/seconder, then the opposer/seconder will have 10 minutes to respond to questions and to sum up. Each side will decide if one or both of their speakers will respond/sum up.

6. The motion will then be put to a vote (including abstentions). A timekeeper and tellers will be appointed.

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