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Talk in Oxford next Wednesday

SitP Oxford - Stephen Law: Believing Bullshit

When: Wed Jul 13, 2011 6:30pm to 8:30pm UTC

Where: Copa of Oxford 9 - 13 George Street Oxford OX1 2AU We use the upstairs function room. To find it, go up the spiral staircase - then look for the door immediately opposite you. Go through, up another flight of stairs and you will find us. There is a bar up here and it should be open. So no need to spill your pint on the spiral stairs.
Event Status: confirmed
Event Description: Skeptics in the Pub Oxford. For more information, see SitP Ref [SitP647Event]


Anonymous said…
What do you make of this guy?
Anonymous said…
Great blog here! I am recently trying to find more- but there are so few. And it doesn't help that I keep finding sites like these.

Or this one:

It's like as if for every sceptic there's ten online theologians with a PHD that where educated at Oxford. What's the deal with that? Also, while on this topic, do you know of any good, scholarly works on theology from an non-christian perspective? I have difficulty understanding what it actually is, what arguments they put foward, and how non-christians respond. Thanks, and keep up the good work!
Anonymous said…
Stephen I heard you interviewed on National Radio today in NZ. You made the statement that as we cannot conceive of an evil God given the good and beauty we see in the world, we can prove no good God exists as an omnipotent good God would prevent evil. That argument is flawed. God being good creates beings with the ultimate capacity-the freedom to love. Consider this - love by definition must be free. Because evil and good exists we can logically assert that God is good. An evil God would by nature prevent freedom. Evil compels; love is free. Evil will be punished by a just God for sure, but in time and space evil must be permitted for a season if human choice and the freedom to love is to exist.
Ben Emlyn-Jones said…
I was there. It was very interesting. Thanks.

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