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Does anyone have good resource info on cell replacement?

Doing a kid's book and need to find out info on how quickly cells are replaced in the human body. I know that some turn over very quickly (liver or kidney) and others more slowly (bone) but that they are all replaced over a decade or two (well, I think so, anyway). Anyone know of a resource? I tried googling but could only find stuff on cancer, etc.

Comments

TaiChi said…
The best I could find:

http://askanaturalist.com/do-we-replace-our-cells-every-7-or-10-years/
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/02/science/02cell.html
http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=372183 (Scroll to JR Brown's posts for a list of citations)
Rowan said…
I think "cell turnover" might be a more useful search term - it yielded this.
Stephen Law said…
Thanks - very helpful...
wombat said…
It would seem to be manifestly untrue in the case of egg cells in the female which are apparently all present at birth and are never replaced. Some of these of course last up to around 45 years or so.

Theres also a bit of an issue isn't there with cell identity surely? If cells reproduce by splitting which is the original and which is the new one or do we consider them both new?
Stephen Law said…
yes I shall write this bit with some care.
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