Skip to main content

CFI UK events in April

In partnership with The Oxford Literary festival CFI UK has the following events lined up in April 2011 (held at Christ Church College, University of Oxford).

A.C. GRAYLING - THE GOOD BOOK: A SECULAR BIBLE

Grayling launches his latest book in the glorious Sheldonian Theatre, Oxford University on Sunday 3rd April, 12pm.

NATHAN PENLINGTON – URI AND ME

Magician/skeptic/entertainer/poet Penlington presents his Edinburgh Festival show Uri and Me for CFI UK. About Uri Geller….. Sunday 3rd April 10am. Venue TBA.

PROF JUSTIN BARRETT – BORN BELIEVERS

Justin Barret, Prof. of Psychology at University of Oxford, explains we he believes we have an innate tendency to religious belief (he is religious himself). He’ll be presenting some fascinating experimental results. 4pm Wed. April 6th. venue TBA.

DOES GOD EXIST?

Stephen Law (author, a Very Short Introduction to Humanism, The Philosophy Gym) debates with Prof Alister McGrath (author of The Dawkins Delusion and A Fine-Tuned Universe – The Quest For God in Science and Theology.) Thursday 7th April, 6.30pm Venue TBA.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, THE PAPACY AND THE HOLOCAUST

John Cornwell, author of Hitler’s Pope and David Ranan, author Double Cross, debate the relationship between the Church and The Holocaust. Friday 8th April 10.oo am. Venue TBA.

Tickets will be available from The Festival website at http://www.oxfordliteraryfestival.com/

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS

(Published in Faith and Philosophy 2011. Volume 28, Issue 2, April 2011. Stephen Law. Pages 129-151) EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS Stephen Law Abstract The vast majority of Biblical historians believe there is evidence sufficient to place Jesus’ existence beyond reasonable doubt. Many believe the New Testament documents alone suffice firmly to establish Jesus as an actual, historical figure. I question these views. In particular, I argue (i) that the three most popular criteria by which various non-miraculous New Testament claims made about Jesus are supposedly corroborated are not sufficient, either singly or jointly, to place his existence beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) that a prima facie plausible principle concerning how evidence should be assessed – a principle I call the contamination principle – entails that, given the large proportion of uncorroborated miracle claims made about Jesus in the New Testament documents, we should, in the absence of indepen

What is Humanism?

What is Humanism? “Humanism” is a word that has had and continues to have a number of meanings. The focus here is on kind of atheistic world-view espoused by those who organize and campaign under that banner in the UK and abroad. We should acknowledge that there remain other uses of term. In one of the loosest senses of the expression, a “Humanist” is someone whose world-view gives special importance to human concerns, values and dignity. If that is what a Humanist is, then of course most of us qualify as Humanists, including many religious theists. But the fact remains that, around the world, those who organize under the label “Humanism” tend to sign up to a narrower, atheistic view. What does Humanism, understood in this narrower way, involve? The boundaries of the concept remain somewhat vague and ambiguous. However, most of those who organize under the banner of Humanism would accept the following minimal seven-point characterization of their world-view.

Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism refuted

Here's my central criticism of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). It's novel and was published in Analysis last year. Here's the gist. Plantinga argues that if naturalism and evolution are true, then semantic epiphenomenalism is very probably true - that's to say, the content of our beliefs does not causally impinge on our behaviour. And if semantic properties such as having such-and-such content or being true cannot causally impinge on behaviour, then they cannot be selected for by unguided evolution. Plantinga's argument requires, crucially, that there be no conceptual links between belief content and behaviour of a sort that it's actually very plausible to suppose exist (note that to suppose there are such conceptual links is not necessarily to suppose that content can be exhaustively captured in terms of behaviour or functional role, etc. in the way logical behaviourists or functionalists suppose). It turns o