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The 2010 KASS Conference
‘What Does It Mean To Be Well Educated?’
Saturday October 9th - 10am till 4pm

This follow-up conference to the KAS Society’s highly successful ‘Should Education Make You Happy’ is filling up fast. Places are limited so if you are planning to attend and haven’t yet registered, please send in your registration form soon.

£15 or £10 for KAS staff (includes continental breakfast and buffet lunch)
To register, please contact Lisa Keane (details below)

Does being ‘well-educated’ simply consist of having the maximum number of A*s or should we develop a broader definition of educational success? A chance to reappraise why we send children to school, this conference’s high-profile speakers are:

* Emeritus Professor John White from the Institute of Education, with new ideas on how to reduce the current ‘insane’ pressure on pupils and how to ‘prevent the education system being a mechanism for separating life’s winners and losers’
* Steve Nelson, Head of Calhoun school in New York, where ‘children’s interests are not a detour from the curriculum, they are the curriculum’, first public talk in the UK
* Dr Catherine Burke from Cambridge University, on taking children seriously in designing education(following her 2001 project with the Guardian asking children to imagine their ideal school)
* Stephen Law, editor of the Royal Society of Philosophy’s magazine THINK, who will defend liberal approaches to raising a ‘good person’
* Professor Frank Furedi, the sociologist most-often turned to by the UK’s media, on the ‘infantilisation’ of education
* Professor Kathryn Ecclestone on whether developing emotional well-being is a progressive or diminished goal for education

BBC radio producer Piers Plowright, Prix Italia triple winner, will be chairing.

***A late addition to the programme: UNICEF/Frances Bestley on their belief that an understanding of rights and responsibilities is central to being ‘well-educated’.



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