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Jesus paper published

The journal Faith and Philosophy have accepted my piece on "Miracles, Evidence and The Existence of Jesus", which evolved from discussions on this blog. So thanks for all your comments, provocations, etc.

I will put the final version up here eventually.

That's three papers in Philosophy of Religion now published. "The Evil God Challenge" has just been published in Religious Studies. "Plantinga's Belief-Cum-Desire Argument Refuted" appears in Religious Studies shortly.

If you want a copy of any of these, let me know...
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Comments

Bogdan said…
I would love to have copies of these three papers.
August 7, 2010 at 12:38 PM
The Uncredible Hallq said…
I'd like to see the final version of the Jesus paper. My just send it to my Google address, username challquist.
August 7, 2010 at 8:56 PM
Patrick said…
Well, I'd be interested in reading them. I take it they won't be online since they're in journals?
August 9, 2010 at 3:14 AM
Stephen Law said…
Bogdan - email me and I'll send as attachments.
August 9, 2010 at 8:24 AM
Evan said…
I just finished reading it today. I think it's a great piece. I would love to see some apologetic responses to it, but I suppose I would have to wait for them.

As you rightly point out, a hermeneutic of suspicion is entirely in order when we are presented with fantasy tales. I doubt even Richard Bauckham believes in the historical Grendel.
August 11, 2010 at 2:30 AM
jbierly said…
I'd like a copy as well! If I e-mail you will you send me a copy as well?
August 12, 2010 at 1:44 PM
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