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Comment moderation

Comment moderation is now on. Shame a loony has to mess it up for the rest of us.

I am off doing via ferrata in the Dolomites till next Tuesday. So comments may wait a few days before appearing. Except for DMs which will compiled for benefit of the police.

Comments

Anonymous said…
A loony?
Stephen Law said…
Apologies for posting comment that I should not have (accident). Now deleted.
E. J. Frogster said…
Dear Stephen,

I am want to send you my song 'Gordon Brown be my Angel' which fetched me 3 letters from 10 Downing Street in July 2009.
It is not really about Gordon Brown but where it's relevant to philosophy it's relevant to the philosophy of law, along with loads of other disciplines like legal history, legal theory, sociology, psychology, English literature and music, medicine and physiology: (so what do you think of it?)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DCEWhEuhRoo (lyrics annotated)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=znUtocdwnYw (BETTER SOUND QUALITY)

Brahms Lullaby

Gordon Brown! Gordon Brown!
Will you be my angel?
Guardian angel is what I meant
Will you rescue my soul?

For you are in charge
Of these people I wrote to
Stephen Timms, Jack Straw
Let me place my trust in you

Gordon Brown! MP’s!
Let me sing out loud
For what you do, for my country
For my reproductive system

You right wrongs! My right’s been wronged
I am desperate for you
Not just you! There’s Jon Herring
I’m a violated woman

Gordon Brown, help me sleep!
Help me sleep like a baby
Will my babies ever come out?
Maternal desires!
I lost my womanhood
In a sinister curse
Gordon Brown! Bring it back!
You are perfect for that!
E. J. Frogster said…
Oops forgot to proofread. Never mind

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