Skip to main content

"230 volts" "AAAARGH!"

There is an interesting article about the Milgram experiment here.

And here's a video:
The Milgram Experiment

James | MySpace Video

Comments

Unknown said…
you little liars do nothing but antagonize...

and you try to eliminate all the dreams and hopes of humanity...

but you LOST...

THE DEATH OF ATH*ISM - SCIENTIFIC PROOF OF GOD

http://engforum.pravda.ru/showthread.php?t=280780

Einstein puts the final nail in the coffin of atheism...

*************************************

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V7vpw4AH8QQ

*************************************

atheists deny their own life element...

LIGHT OR DEATH, ATHEISTS?

********************************
***************************LIGHT*********
************************************
LIGHT
April 2, 2010 at 8:35 PM
The Atheist Missionary said…
Just google "David Mabus". What a nutjob.
April 3, 2010 at 1:09 PM
DM said…
you little liars do nothing but antagonize...

and you try to eliminate all the dreams and hopes of humanity...

but you LOST...
April 3, 2010 at 11:29 PM
Unknown said…
I liked your post. Keep posting interesting matters here.

Best Attorney
April 6, 2010 at 4:40 AM
Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS

(Published in Faith and Philosophy 2011. Volume 28, Issue 2, April 2011. Stephen Law. Pages 129-151) EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS Stephen Law Abstract The vast majority of Biblical historians believe there is evidence sufficient to place Jesus’ existence beyond reasonable doubt. Many believe the New Testament documents alone suffice firmly to establish Jesus as an actual, historical figure. I question these views. In particular, I argue (i) that the three most popular criteria by which various non-miraculous New Testament claims made about Jesus are supposedly corroborated are not sufficient, either singly or jointly, to place his existence beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) that a prima facie plausible principle concerning how evidence should be assessed – a principle I call the contamination principle – entails that, given the large proportion of uncorroborated miracle claims made about Jesus in the New Testament documents, we should, in the absence of indepen
159 comments
Read more

What is Humanism?

What is Humanism? “Humanism” is a word that has had and continues to have a number of meanings. The focus here is on kind of atheistic world-view espoused by those who organize and campaign under that banner in the UK and abroad. We should acknowledge that there remain other uses of term. In one of the loosest senses of the expression, a “Humanist” is someone whose world-view gives special importance to human concerns, values and dignity. If that is what a Humanist is, then of course most of us qualify as Humanists, including many religious theists. But the fact remains that, around the world, those who organize under the label “Humanism” tend to sign up to a narrower, atheistic view. What does Humanism, understood in this narrower way, involve? The boundaries of the concept remain somewhat vague and ambiguous. However, most of those who organize under the banner of Humanism would accept the following minimal seven-point characterization of their world-view.
10 comments
Read more

Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism refuted

Here's my central criticism of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). It's novel and was published in Analysis last year. Here's the gist. Plantinga argues that if naturalism and evolution are true, then semantic epiphenomenalism is very probably true - that's to say, the content of our beliefs does not causally impinge on our behaviour. And if semantic properties such as having such-and-such content or being true cannot causally impinge on behaviour, then they cannot be selected for by unguided evolution. Plantinga's argument requires, crucially, that there be no conceptual links between belief content and behaviour of a sort that it's actually very plausible to suppose exist (note that to suppose there are such conceptual links is not necessarily to suppose that content can be exhaustively captured in terms of behaviour or functional role, etc. in the way logical behaviourists or functionalists suppose). It turns o
151 comments
Read more