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New pharmacy code continues opt-outs over beliefs

Pharmacists across the UK have been told they can continue to refuse to prescribe items that might clash with their personal religious beliefs.

A revised code of conduct from the new industry regulator will allow staff to opt out of providing items such as the morning-after pill and contraception.

Continues here.


Christopher said…
Hi Stephen,
This is off topic but I thought you might appreciate my latest blog post, or rather the video i posted - on the rise of Dominionism (or Christian Reconstructionism) in the U.S. ( Facinating interview with a former NY times writer and theologian Chris Hodges; more than a little unsettling as I think you will agree.

By the by, i really appreciate your blog; it's an island or reason in the sea of absurdity Stephen. Keep up the good work! I will be back at Heythrop in Septermber when my erasmus stint runs out here in Uppsala so we will meet again in Logic. Best regards. Chris Landau
Suem said…
See, here is an example of the privileges and protections of religious conscience allowed to Christians.

What are the bishops moaning about? ( I am a Christian by the way.)

Fantastic blog!
I should say it is a detailed article. Talks about a variety of things - something which I never thought could exist. What I found different in your article is the way you have gone about to explain the topic in a simplistic way.

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