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GUARDIAN: Furious backlash from Simon Singh libel case puts chiropractors on ropes

Furious backlash from Simon Singh libel case puts chiropractors on ropes

One in four chiropractors in Britain are under investigation as a result of campaign by Singh supporters, reveals Martin Robbins (in the Guardian).

As the British Chiropractic Association's battle with Simon Singh continues to work its way through the legal system, chiropractors are counting the financial costs of a major backlash resulting from a libel action that has left the Lord Chief Justice "baffled". What was originally a dispute between the BCA and one science writer over free speech has become a brutally effective campaign to reform an entire industry.

A staggering one in four chiropractors in Britain are now under investigation for allegedly making misleading claims in advertisements, according to figures from the General Chiropractic Council.

The council, which is responsible for regulating the profession and has 2,400 chiropractors on its books, informs me that it has had to recruit six new members of staff to deal with a fifteenfold increase in complaints against its members – from 40 a year to 600. While it declined to comment directly on the costs inflicted by the reaction to the BCA's actions, it is clear that a six-figure sum will be involved for the extra staffing costs alone, to which will have to be added the considerable costs of any misconduct hearings.


Continues here.

Comments

jeremy said…
This makes me happy. So very, very happy :)

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