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Fakery, Wackery and Tragedy Aids Science Teaching

From the TES.

Conspiracy theories, creationism and 9/11 can help children to evaluate evidence, expert argues

Original paper headline: Fakery, wackery and tragedy: all grist to the mill in science teaching

Internet conspiracy theories and the controversy over creationism should be embraced as opportunities to engage pupils in scientific theory and critical thinking, according to a leading science educationalist.

Anu Ojha, head of education at the National Space Centre in Leicester, argues that the tactic is the best way to “guide our children through the labyrinth of information, misinformation, claim and counterclaim which characterises scientific discourse in the media and online”.

He says that the internet is the main source for scientific, societal and political information for the new generation of “21st century citizens”, born from 1995 onwards.

That leaves them susceptible to unsubstantiated claims such as the idea that the moon landings were faked - believed by a quarter of the British population, according to a poll last year - and that the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre were a Western conspiracy.

Mr Ojha, who taught secondary science for 13 years, says teachers should tackle these theories head on and show pupils how scientific knowledge can be used to discredit them.

Delivering the annual Tribal education lecture last week, he cited three arguments used to support a 9/11 conspiracy theory (see box).

By pulling them apart using science, teachers could both deliver the curriculum and give pupils the crucial “critical thinking skills that they’re going to need to navigate this turbulent information ocean in which they find themselves adrift”, he said.

Teachers should also be prepared to tackle the debate over creationism, he said.

“It’s fantastic for evaluating degrees of evidence, highlighting the crucial difference between dogma and evidence-based scientific theory,” Mr Ojha said in the lecture.

Afterwards he told The TES: “It is not about opening the floodgates to creationism in the classroom. It is about being confident enough in having the levels of evidence to back up the scientific point of view.”

Peter Main, Institute of Physics director of education and science, said: “There will inevitably be cases where a pupil raises topics such as creationism.

“A good science teacher may choose to use the question to illustrate why the particular theory is not scientific,” he said.


Continues here.

Comments

Giford said…
Exactly right, imo.

It's all too easy to get your case across in the internet age, no matter what it's (lack of) merits. Distinguishing the ridiculous from the credible is going to be a vital skill - and it's the best way to promote a whole raft of 'common sense'/rationalism issues - evolution, vaccines, global warming and others.

Gif
pikeamus Mike said…
A fair few biology teachers, especially in the US, already debunk YEC as part of teaching evolution precisely because it's a good example of being led by the evidence. PZ Myers, for example, covers creationism in the very first lecture of his introduction to evolutionary biology (a first year college course) each year.

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