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Snow white Britain from space - fantastic Nasa image

Britain from space - covered in snow. Thanks to Nasa. Go here.

Comments

DM said…
the atheist sins not only against God, but also against man...

Atheist:

have you for but a moment considered that you have adopted a position against 98% of the human race, both past and present?

do you think you are RIGHT and they are all WRONG?

WRONG

now listen to this arrogant puffed up son of a bitch....
youtube.com/watch?v=ilWM7jIEN_k

little scientist geek who would try to usurp God Himself!!!

forums.leagueofreason.co.uk/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=2980

you really need to add comment moderation to your blasphemy...
Kosh3 said…
'DM' - you've been posting this word for word all over the net. Copy and paste is fun, but is there some actual point to it? I am curious to know.
Unknown said…
DM i think you are perhaps an absolute retard if you think that just because people believe it means it is true. people used to believe the world was flat and that isnt true is it?
Anonymous said…
Just to bring the comments back on track...

Re: snow. Pretty, but euch; very much fed up of taking hours to walk anywhere because of the f*****g ice. Bring on the melt.

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