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Bad Faith Awards

Every year, New Humanist presents its Bad Faith Award to the individual deemed by readers to have made the most outstanding contribution to the cause of unreason. Last year saw a runaway victory for erstwhile US vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin, as she romped home with a stunning 33 per cent of the vote. The polls for this year’s award opened in November, and once again they produced a clear winner... read more.

Thanks to my Dad.


Mike said…
An early favorite for next year's award would have to be the television evangelist Pat Robertson, who on Wednesday offered viewers of the Christian Broadcasting Network his own causal explanation of the tragic earthquake in Haiti. In case you haven't already seen it on YouTube or read about it, here's some of what Robertson said:

"Something happened a long time ago in Haiti, and people might not want to talk about it. They were under the heel of the French...and they got together and swore a pact to the devil. They said, 'We will serve you if you'll get us free from the French.' True Story. And so the devil said, 'Ok, it's a deal.'...Ever since, they have been cursed by one thing after the other."
David Pilavin said…
It seems to me that things like this "award" reduce the underlying debates to personal attacks.

And that in itself is harmful to reason.

(Although it is true that some of the people that received the "award" are not above using such personal attacks themselves but it seems to me that this alone does not justify similar behavior on the part of their opponents.

It's like saying that since in countries under Islamic laws homosexuals are persecuted we should therefore persecute Muslims in our countries. It does not make much more sence than that...)

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