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Thought For The Day will continue to exclude non-religious

The BBC Trust announced today:

The BBC Trust today announced its findings on a number of appeals about the broadcast of Radio 4's Thought for the Day and BBC editorial policy on non-religious content.

The Trust found that the editorial policy of only allowing religious contributors to participate on Thought for the Day does not breach either the BBC Editorial Guideline on impartiality or the BBC's duty to reflect religious and other beliefs in its programming.
Go here.


Toby said…
There's a lot of comment on this on the Guardian's article. Most of the comments are against the Trust's decision. As they would be; I don't see how the ban can be justified without taking the line that religious beliefs are somehow "special" and normal rules don't apply to them.

The question is, Where dopes the campaign against TFTD go next?
wombat said…
OK TFTD is reserved for religious output much in the same way that "Poetry Please" is reserved for poetic output, but why should that limit the contributors? Cannot agnostics or atheists express religious thoughts in the same way as a non-poet mights occasionally produce verse? What next - not being allowed to add up because you are not a member of the Guild of Mathematicians?
AD said…
This is easy. Atheism is a religious belief, even if it negates the existence of god, it is still a belief directly concerned with religion - and indeed is itself a "religion".

Once we convince them of that, then there is room to have an "Atheist" or "Agnostic" or "Skeptic" though of the day in the programme.

"The Trust found that Thought for the Day is religious output and that it is a matter of editorial discretion for the BBC Executive and its Director General as Editor-in-Chief as to whether the BBC broadcasts a slot commenting on an issue of the day from a faith perspective."

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