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STUDENT ESSAY COMPETITION


Express yourself!

Campaign for Free Expression Essay Contest

The Campaign for Free Expression is a CFI initiative to focus efforts and attention on one of the most crucial components of freethought: the right of individuals to express their viewpoints, opinions, and beliefs about all subjects—especially religion. To encourage free expression and to emphasize the importance of this fundamental right, CFI and its sister organization, The Council for Secular Humanism, are sponsoring this contest.

Free Expression Essay Contest: Students enrolled in an accredited college or university are invited to submit an essay about "The Importance of Free Expression and Its Limits (If Any)." Each entry must address the question of what limits national governments or recognized international bodies, such as the United Nations, may justifiably place on free expression. First prize is $2,000 (USD).

Open to UK STUDENTS, e.g. mine!

* Download Free Expression Essay Contest Rules and get full details here.

For more information about the Campaign for Free Expression, please e-mail info@centerforinquiry.net.

Comments

Michael Young said…
The post and link don't indicate whether the contest is only open to undergraduates or not. I would be interested to know, if this can be clarified.
November 20, 2009 at 12:45 AM
Anonymous said…
Does this include A level colleges or does it mean the American kind of college?
November 21, 2009 at 4:13 PM
Stephen Law said…
just asking them now...
November 21, 2009 at 4:51 PM
Anonymous said…
Thank you, I would love to enter if I can...
November 23, 2009 at 7:13 PM
Anonymous said…
Waiting to hear whether A level students are eligible to enter (UK on distance learning course with Oxford College)
November 25, 2009 at 6:34 PM
Stephen Law said…
still waiting to hear....
November 25, 2009 at 6:45 PM
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