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MONSTERS FROM THE DEEP! A Fortean adventure

If you are in the vicinity of London and are interested in Fortean and skeptical topics, do please come to Monsters from the Deep! It promises to be a fascinating journey into the deep sea myths and legends, from the perspective of science.

Registration 10.30-11am. Finish 3pm (QandA session till 3.30pm if you want to stay longer).

No booking required - just show up. Directions here.

SPES/CFIUK present:
MONSTERS FROM THE DEEP!
An interactive skeptical odyssey – with sound effects! University experts investigate tales of sea-monsters, mermaids, etc.

Saturday, 7th November, 11am-3pm (with good break for lunch) £10.
Free to members of cfi uk, glha, spes, bha, new humanist and subscribers.

Dr Charles Paxton, a scientist from the University of St Andrews, is one of the country’s most qualified cryptozoologists, and he will be running both a lecture and workshop on monsters from the deep – mythical and real. Dr Darren Naish is a researcher at The University of Portsmouth, who will talk about the ‘prehistoric survivor paradigm’ and what it means (or doesn’t mean) for ’sea monster’ sightings. An interactive skeptical odyssey….

Venue: Conway Hall, 25 Red Lion Square, Holborn, London WC1R 4RL – Main Hall.

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