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Quote for discussion

Even though they're soldiers and know killing is part of their responsibility and duty, a number of them come to me very bothered about it…Our challenge is to assure them that what they are doing is morally acceptable from a Christian perspective and a patriotic one.

Major Eric Albertson, a Roman Catholic Chaplain in Iraq The Times, 8 Dec 2004, p.37

Comments

anticant said…
It's a challenge the Roman Catholic Church has been remarkably successful in meeting down the ages! See:

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Double-Cross-Code-Catholic-Church/dp/0955413303/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1255007449&sr=1-5
Mike said…
It would be a challenge, indeed, for the chaplain to explain why killing is morally acceptable from a Christian perspective. It sounds to me like he may have some soul-searching of his own to do.
anticant said…
Ah, but you see they invented the doctrine of the 'Just War' - which in former times included wiping out all heretics in the name of "Gentle Jesus" - the Christian equivalent of Jihad.
Peter said…
What's to discuss?

It's uncontroversial that sometimes it's morally OK to kill (insert your favourite hypothetical about genocide prevention here). And he's a Christian, so he quite rightly thinks that that particular moral judgement is alright by Christianity's books.
Billy said…
Well, the bible does give mixed messages. The book of Joshua says it's alright to kill children if god says so. One would expect an "omnipotent" "moral" god to be a clear communicator.
Giford said…
I was more concerned by this quote from Gen Sir Richard Dannatt, head of the UK Army:

"In my business, asking people to risk their lives is part of the job, but doing so without giving them the chance to understand that there is a life after death is something of a betrayal"

Gif

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