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IS RELIGION A FORCE FOR GOOD OR EVIL?

Royal Academy of Dramatic Art
18 Chenies Street, London, WC1E 7PA

Dr Nigel Warburton, Philosophy Lecturer & Author
Hamza Andreas Tzortzis, International Public Speaker &
Researcher for the Hittin Institute

DEBATE: IS RELIGION A FORCE FOR GOOD OR EVIL?
THURSDAY 18TH JUNE 2009, 6:30PM


Please book your place: religion.goodorevil@googlemail.com

Tickets: £2.00 at the door

Chaired by: Dr Mark Vernon Writer, Author & Broadcaster

According to a recent poll carried out by YouGov nearly half of the British public think that religion is harmful. However more than half also believe in God or “something”.

Many argue that belief in God is irrational and harmful to society, they also maintain that religion fuels hatred, bigotry and war. Critics on the other hand say that religion produces great good such as charities, dealing with bereavement and that is the only rational basis for morality.

So who is right? Are we better off without religion or should society have more of it?
To discuss this and other related issues join our distinguished panel.

www.centrallondonhumanists.org

Comments

wombat said…
Yes - like dictatorships can be benign or malign.
Anonymous said…
Ask the Irish.
Anonymous said…
I missread the word 'force' as 'farce'. Or did I?
Dick said…
Anticant is right : religion just is - it's a component of the human psyche. It isn't necessarily to do with 'belief in God' - it's an experience and a mechanism and a language for dealing with life's mystery. It can be done dishonestly or manipulatively or with ruthless honesty and humility. There's nothing so dangerous as the former, nothing so creative as the latter.

There's plenty of bad religion around. But you can't eradicate religion without eradicating people - so you have to get in there and show how to do it well.

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