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Standing Stone, Arran


Shot up to Isle of Arran (Scotland) for 4 nights with family after US trip. It's a fantastic place. Just don't go in the midge season. My photos at flickr.
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A sympathetic Scotsman said…
Ah, the legendary Scottish midges!

There are many stories of hard-drinking Glasgow tough-men being driven to tears by the little beasties (or throwing themselves fully-clothed into freezing lochs just to escape their persecution...)
April 26, 2009 at 4:24 PM
Cassanders said…
If only the "noseeums" had the grace to stay exclusively in Scotland :-(

I can tell you there are oodles in western Norway as well.
Especially annoying is their preference for nice weather.
The only time you escape them in summer is when a cold northernly brezze/gale sweeps the terrain.

Cassanders
In Cod we trust
April 27, 2009 at 10:44 AM
Stephen Law said…
I have a big problem with them. In Spain last year, neither wife nor two daughters got bitten. I counted 50 bites on one leg alone. Not just little bites - big, incredibly itchy things. I never once got to see what caused them.
April 27, 2009 at 5:35 PM
Cassanders said…
The reactions to bites varies considerably among people, as well as their "talent" as noseeum-magnets. Slightly funny that you didn't pass along those particular scent qualities to your daughters, but I am sure they don't mind having missed that legacy :-)

The types of biting mites (Ceratopogonidae) that especially haunt us, are adapted to Atlantic climate/vegetation. Typical they would follow the distribution of heather along the Western coast of Europe from Portugal to Mid-western Norway (including the British Isles).

Cassanders
In Cod we trust
April 27, 2009 at 9:25 PM
said…
In Go D Wet Rust
April 28, 2009 at 2:38 AM
anticant said…
"I never once got to see what caused them."

Of course you didn't. God is invisible.
April 28, 2009 at 7:06 PM
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