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Baggini on Hume (IV)

Julian's 4th piece on Hume is up on the Guardian website. Still no defence of his claim that:

The most pressing and telling critiques of religion not only cannot, but should not, attempt to deliver any fatal blows...

Comments

Anonymous said…
According to Julian's twitter:

"Reading Hume: Beliefs form an interconnected whole. That’s why there are no knock-down arguments against religion."

I think I'd need to see the evidence for the first part of this argument - why do beliefs form an interconnected whole? And how does this suggest there are no knock-down arguments against religion? Does this not pre-suppose that atheism is a belief?
March 2, 2009 at 6:16 PM
Stephen Law said…
Emma - that sounds like an argument that knock down arguments against anything are impossible.

I wonder if it's supposed to be a knock-down argument?!
March 2, 2009 at 6:48 PM
Anonymous said…
Well blow me over...
March 2, 2009 at 7:00 PM
Stephen Law said…
The interconnectedness bit sounds like a reference to e.g. the Quine-Duhem thesis. Check this out:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duhem-Quine_thesis
March 2, 2009 at 7:20 PM
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