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A Level Philosophy One day Conferences 2009

A Level Philosophy One day Conferences 2009

Programme - Thursday 5th March 2009 and Friday 6th March 2009


10.30 Registration
11.00 Chris Horner: Ethics tips for A Level
12.00 Nigel Warburton (Philosophy: The Basics; Philosophy: The Classics): Mill and Plato on Freedom
1.00 - 2.00 Lunch break
2.00 Stephen Law (The Philosophy Files, The Philosophy Gym): Descartes proof that he is not his body
3.00 Michael Lacewing (co-author of Philosophy for AS Level): The origin of God
4.00 End

VENUE:
The venue is Heythrop College, Kensington Square, London W5 8HX, which is just a two minute walk from Kensington High Street tube station.

COST:
£16 per student/teacher.
Bookings will be accepted via e mail at alevelconference@heythrop.ac.uk and post.
Please note that payment must be received within ten days or the booking will be automatically cancelled.
Cheques should be made payable to HEYTHROP COLLEGE.
Please note that fees are non-refundable.
Confirmation of your booking will be sent along with travel directions.

OTHER INFORMATION:
A sandwich lunch will be provided for teachers.
There is a canteen on site which is open to all visitors selling a range of snacks, drinks, sandwiches and hot food.
Enquiries can be sent to alevelconference@heythrop.ac.uk
The college reserves the right to alter the programme.

Comments

Anonymous said…
Will you do one "up north"? Even us housewives, farmers and coal miners need some intellectual stimulation, but everything's always down in London. In fact, as everyone down south is rolling in it, and us folk up north are left struggling along with our coal fires, straw beds and extra toes, maybe the events could be up north instead, so the southerners have to pay the higher rail fares?

Just a thought...

I'm not a raging lunatic, by the way. Just a little bored. He he he.

Sally
Stephen Law said…
Hi Sally

I can come up North. But Heythrop conferences are at Heythrop inevitably. If you want event for your school or whatever get in touch...

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