Skip to main content

CFI event at Sunday Times Oxford Literary Festival

I have arranged for CFI to put on three events at the Oxford Literary festival - two adult events and one for kids.

The biggest event is a debate between myself and Prof. Roger Trigg on Secularism. Friday April 3rd 2pm in the Great Hall at Christchurch. Tickets from Oxford Literary Festival.

Is Britain too secular now?


Is it right that British society be explicitly founded on Christian values? Is there something special about religion - and particularly the Christian religion - that justifies giving it a special, privileged role within our society? Should the state fund faith schools?

Philosopher Professor Roger Trigg believes secularization now threatens the fabric of British society. He defends the view that our freedoms are rooted in a Christian tradition and that, unless our Christian heritage is explicitly acknowledged and valued by the State, those freedoms may be at risk.

Philosopher Stephen Law argues that there is nothing about religious beliefs that justifies giving them such special treatment, and that it’s high time we kicked the church out of our state.

Roger Trigg is the author of Religion in Public Life: Must Religion be Privatized? He is also Senior Research Fellow at The Ian Ramsey Centre, University of Oxford, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick and a former President of the Mind Association and of the British Society for Philosophy of Religion.

Stephen Law is the author of The War For Children’s Minds (which is critical of many faith schools). He is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy Heythrop College University of London, editor of THINK (journal of Royal Institute of Philosophy) and Provost of The Centre for Inquiry London.

Format 10-15 mins presentation by each speaker followed by 30 minutes of QandA.

Comments

anticant said…
Sounds interesting. I hope you will make the point that not just Christianity, but any religion, is socially divisive - not cohesive. Each sect strives to proclaim its 'correctness' and impose this on everyone else.

If you look at the 16th and 17th centuries - from the Reformation to the Civil Wars - religious disputes played a thoroughly malign part in setting people against one another. They squabbled endlessly about their respective concepts of God and the proper way to worship Him, with endless persecutions, killings, and finally civil war.

What was it all about? practically everything these people believed was in fact nonsense.
Steven Carr said…
Should we go back to religious tests for students to study at Oxford and Cambridge?

Or did Christian values meant that it was those freedom-loving Christians who campaigned against those horrible secular pagans who were imposing religious tests on students for Oxbridge?

And, freedom-loving Christians worked for years against the creeping secularization of Parliament, where secularists had introduced religious tests for people who wanted to be Members of Parliament.

Hoorah for freedom-loving Christians who destroyed all these religious tests and restriction that secularists had imposed on British life!
anticant said…
I myself would welcome a return of the Test Acts.

Popular posts from this blog

The Evil God Challenge and the "classical" theist's response

On another blog, FideCogitActio, some theists of a "classical" stripe (that's to say, like Brian Davies, Edward Feser) are criticisng the Evil God Challenge (or I suppose, trying to show how it can be met, or sidestepped). The main post includes this: In book I, chapter 39 , Aquinas argues that “there cannot be evil in God” (in Deo non potest esse malum). Atheists like Law must face the fact that, if the words are to retain any sense, “God” simply cannot be “evil”. As my comments in the thread at Feser’s blog aimed to show, despite how much he mocks “the privation theory of evil,” Law himself cannot escape its logic: his entire argument requires that the world ought to appear less evil if it is to be taken as evidence of a good God. Even though he spurns the idea that evil is a privation of good, his account of an evil world is parasitic on a good ideal; this is no surprise, though, since all evil is parasitic on good ( SCG I, 11 ). Based on the conclusions of se...

EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS

(Published in Faith and Philosophy 2011. Volume 28, Issue 2, April 2011. Stephen Law. Pages 129-151) EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS Stephen Law Abstract The vast majority of Biblical historians believe there is evidence sufficient to place Jesus’ existence beyond reasonable doubt. Many believe the New Testament documents alone suffice firmly to establish Jesus as an actual, historical figure. I question these views. In particular, I argue (i) that the three most popular criteria by which various non-miraculous New Testament claims made about Jesus are supposedly corroborated are not sufficient, either singly or jointly, to place his existence beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) that a prima facie plausible principle concerning how evidence should be assessed – a principle I call the contamination principle – entails that, given the large proportion of uncorroborated miracle claims made about Jesus in the New Testament documents, we should, in the absence of indepen...

Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism refuted

Here's my central criticism of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). It's novel and was published in Analysis last year. Here's the gist. Plantinga argues that if naturalism and evolution are true, then semantic epiphenomenalism is very probably true - that's to say, the content of our beliefs does not causally impinge on our behaviour. And if semantic properties such as having such-and-such content or being true cannot causally impinge on behaviour, then they cannot be selected for by unguided evolution. Plantinga's argument requires, crucially, that there be no conceptual links between belief content and behaviour of a sort that it's actually very plausible to suppose exist (note that to suppose there are such conceptual links is not necessarily to suppose that content can be exhaustively captured in terms of behaviour or functional role, etc. in the way logical behaviourists or functionalists suppose). It turns o...