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FRSA etc.

Apologies for there being fewer posts. I am totally snowed under, what with beginning of term, plus getting some rather labour-intensive, but rather exciting, things sorted for Centre for Inquiry. News on that shortly.

I will, eventually, be getting back to a number of issues left hanging, such as Jesus' historicity.

God Delusion Chpt. 6 will be tomorrow.

One bit of news is that I have been elected a fellow by the Royal Society of Arts, which means I'm an FRSA. I initially threw their invitation to become a fellow in the bin, as I had little idea what the RSA was, and you have to pay £120 p.a. to belong. Then they contacted me again and I realized it was, actually, something of an honour to be invited. Their building on the Strand is rather impressive, and has wifi, a cheap bar and decent restaurant. It seems, primarily, to be a club. Karl Marx, Adam Smith and Dickens were all members.


anticant said…
Congratulations! Sounds as if you'll be in good company.
Many congratulations, well deserved.
Paul P. Mealing said…
Well done Stephen. Sounds like an honour.

Regards, Paul.
Paul said…
Anonymous said…
Woo hoo! Kudos, glory, all that stuff.

Bin thing very funny. Yes it is a bit of an honour - even I know that!
anticant said…
Marx and Dickens members of the same club? What a fascinating thought! Maybe they swapped ideas. And could the low-life scenes in "Oliver Twist" have originated from Engels' "Condition of the Working Classes"?

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