Skip to main content

King's Philosophical Theology Seminar

I am giving a short presentation on the evil god challenge at 11am 29th April. Details and full programme here.

King's Philosophical Theology Seminar

28-29 April 2008
King's College London, Strand, River Room

A workshop providing a forum of discussion for work in progress in
philosophical theology. Organized by the *Centre for the History of
Philosophical Theology*.

Please contact Dr Maria Rosa Antognazza (maria.rosa.antogna...@kcl.ac.uk)
Labels:

Comments

Anonymous said…
Professor Law,
This is off the topic of your post on "King's Seminar," but I'm hoping that you will notice this comment and give me a quick response. I was talking to a coworker (I'm an English instructor at Antelope Valley College in Lancaster, Ca), and he told me that an anti-abortion group, at a mall in Los Angeles, was passing out Dr. Seuss' book, "Horton Hears a Who." I have two small children, and have the book at home, and when I read it again, I saw an anti-abortion analogy functioning in it, but what struck me most was that Plantinga's "sensus divinitatus" (which has always sounded to me like a dental disease) is in the story. I'd urge you to get a copy and take a look yourself. Horton (because of his big elephant ears) has a sense not readily available to others. He has a direct experience of hearing a city of little "people" on a flower, but cannot convince others of his direct perception. Anyway, Seuss' book struck me as a reflection on epistimology, and another way to come at the whole "sensus divinitatus" issue that you've been discussing in earlier posts. Also, I assume that you are writing a book that includes this subject, and that you might be in search of amusing analogies. I hope that I put you on a trail to something useful.
--Santi Tafarella (Ca)
April 2, 2008 at 6:01 AM
Stephen Law said…
Thanks - I have never read it but will buy a copy this week...
April 2, 2008 at 7:54 AM
Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

The Evil God Challenge and the "classical" theist's response

On another blog, FideCogitActio, some theists of a "classical" stripe (that's to say, like Brian Davies, Edward Feser) are criticisng the Evil God Challenge (or I suppose, trying to show how it can be met, or sidestepped). The main post includes this: In book I, chapter 39 , Aquinas argues that “there cannot be evil in God” (in Deo non potest esse malum). Atheists like Law must face the fact that, if the words are to retain any sense, “God” simply cannot be “evil”. As my comments in the thread at Feser’s blog aimed to show, despite how much he mocks “the privation theory of evil,” Law himself cannot escape its logic: his entire argument requires that the world ought to appear less evil if it is to be taken as evidence of a good God. Even though he spurns the idea that evil is a privation of good, his account of an evil world is parasitic on a good ideal; this is no surprise, though, since all evil is parasitic on good ( SCG I, 11 ). Based on the conclusions of se...
446 comments
Read more

EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS

(Published in Faith and Philosophy 2011. Volume 28, Issue 2, April 2011. Stephen Law. Pages 129-151) EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS Stephen Law Abstract The vast majority of Biblical historians believe there is evidence sufficient to place Jesus’ existence beyond reasonable doubt. Many believe the New Testament documents alone suffice firmly to establish Jesus as an actual, historical figure. I question these views. In particular, I argue (i) that the three most popular criteria by which various non-miraculous New Testament claims made about Jesus are supposedly corroborated are not sufficient, either singly or jointly, to place his existence beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) that a prima facie plausible principle concerning how evidence should be assessed – a principle I call the contamination principle – entails that, given the large proportion of uncorroborated miracle claims made about Jesus in the New Testament documents, we should, in the absence of indepen...
159 comments
Read more

Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism refuted

Here's my central criticism of Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). It's novel and was published in Analysis last year. Here's the gist. Plantinga argues that if naturalism and evolution are true, then semantic epiphenomenalism is very probably true - that's to say, the content of our beliefs does not causally impinge on our behaviour. And if semantic properties such as having such-and-such content or being true cannot causally impinge on behaviour, then they cannot be selected for by unguided evolution. Plantinga's argument requires, crucially, that there be no conceptual links between belief content and behaviour of a sort that it's actually very plausible to suppose exist (note that to suppose there are such conceptual links is not necessarily to suppose that content can be exhaustively captured in terms of behaviour or functional role, etc. in the way logical behaviourists or functionalists suppose). It turns o...
151 comments
Read more