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You can subscribe to THINK: Philosophy For Everyone, a journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, by going to the website here.

There are many sample articles available here (including some by me)

THINK is being published by Cambridge University Press from Issue 19 onwards. It is edited by me. You can submit pieces via my email address above.


Unknown said…

My colleague and I are working on a paper which we will submit to Think in the coming months. The working title is: Divination at Longshan Temple. It follows the discussion between two people in the courtyard of Longshan Temple (Taipei, Taiwan) about the intentionality of casting divination blocks. We hope it turns out well! Anyway, if you have a spare moment, you may like to visit my Wittgenstein blog at :

Many thanks and take care!


Simon van Rysewyk
Stephen Law said…
Thanks Simon - look forward to getting it.
Anonymous said…

When do you expect issue 15 to be published? It's seems ages since issue 14 was published...


A subscriber
Anonymous said…
Wonderful blog.
Anonymous said…
Anonymous said…
Hi Stephen

I've been trying to set up a new (individual) subscription to Think. When I click on 'click here to access our order form' I select the appropriate options but on submission receive the following message: 'Not Found. The requested URL /philo7/think/order2.php was not found on this server.' Do you know when this will be fixed?

All the best,

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