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Comment moderation

Because of a sudden huge increase in the number of fake comments from advertizers, I'm introducing comment moderation. That means genuine comments might be delayed a short while before appearing. Apologies.

Comments

Bob Churchill said…
Can you not set up Blogger so that people with a history of previously approved posts are pre-approved for moderation?
Stephen Law said…
Hi Bob

I cannot figure out how to do that. If you know, please tell me!

Blogger is fairly basic. Hopefully they'll give up after a while in which case I'll drop the moderation. But at the moment I am being inundated.
Psiomniac said…
The way I cured this was to enable word verification, as advertisers generally use bots which cannot get past this system. Have you considered this option?
Anonymous said…
Alright Steve,
u were at my school today.
i share the same views with u, i liked the speech.
so do all those christian people get on with u or not?

god bless
(jokes)
Stephen Law said…
Hello Evo

Yes we are quite matey, generally. Though I did slightly lose my rag with the Young Earth creationist at the end (because he wouldn't be honest).
Stephen Law said…
Psiomniac - I don't think word verification is an option on blogger. If you know it is, let me know...
Anonymous said…
Word verification is certainly an option on Blogger. Here.

If the link doesn't work, just search from the Blogger front page on "word verification". Or the option is in Settings Comments.
Stephen Law said…
ah, thanks potentilla!

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