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Stephen Colbert interviews Dinesh D'Souza on why Liberals are to blame for 9/11

Stephen Colbert, interviewing Dinesh D'Souza, a neo-conservative (Colbert will be familiar to U.S. audiences, but not U.K., hence my post).

Go here and scroll down the play list to Dinesh (near bottom of list). Explains why liberals are to blame for 9/11. I found it very amusing, anyway...

I also recommend Colbert's interview with Elaine Pagels on the Judas gospel (again, scroll down)...

Incidentally, Colbert's concept of "truthiness" is particularly philosophically intriguing.

Brits may also be unaware of Colbert's famous speech to the White House Correspondent's dinner. Starts a bit lame, but builds....

http://timesonline.typepad.com/photos/uncategorized/stephen_colbert_1.jpg

Comments

jeremy said…
If you liked that clip, you'll LOVE this one: Colbert 'agreeing' with Bill O'Reilly (who has previously featured on this site)...

'nough said :)
Stephen Law said…
Thanks for the link, Jeremy. I understand that, after the success of Colbert and John Stewart, Fox are going to try to do a "comedy" show of their own, now? Unfortunately I can't get Colbert, or Fox, for that matter...
jeremy said…
I don't get either either (! - weird sentence). But if there's any truth to Colbert's assessment of Fox, then we've only one of the two to grieve about missing!
seev said…
Well I'm lucky to be in America in terms of being able to get Colbert and Jon Stewart. I doubt that Fox would be able to get a comedy show at all comparable to Colbert and Stewart. The latest polls I believe show that young people in America are becoming increasingly liberal, which is great for the nation!
seev said…
Here's a link that supports the statement I made that young people in America are becoming increasingly liberal: http://politicalwire.com/archives/2007/07/27/republican_support_collapses_among_youth.html

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