Skip to main content

Prejudice Blindness vs Prejudice Goggles




Both these things *can* be true:

1. Prejudice blindness. Not being the target of prejudice ourselves, we can easily miss it (so we should always listen).

2. Prejudice goggles. Considering ourselves or a minority a target, paranoia kicks in and we start 'seeing' prejudice where it isn't (and supposing those who can't see it must blind, or worse).

E.g. some say anti-black racism against Meghan Markle is a figment of the woke imagination (and her own). Others say it's real, and we should listen and take seriously: those who can't see it are ignorant or worse.

So which way do you lean on the following, and why?

Allegations of Islamophobia
Racism in the Metropolitan Police
Daily Mail coverage of immigration
Sarah Vine's suggestions that Meghan Markle is herself being racist against 'our culture' (by mocking curtsying to The Queen)
David Baddiel on treatment of Jewish people
Sexism in the workplace
Trans rights

I guess most of us lean in different directions on different issues. Melanie Philips thinks Islamophobia doesn't even exist. Some claim almost all accusations of prejudice are unfounded and indeed 'political correctness gone mad'. Others say that anyone who even questions whether self-identifying trans athletes in all sports is a good idea, or who thinks immigration is a problem, has already revealed themselves to be a bigot.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS

(Published in Faith and Philosophy 2011. Volume 28, Issue 2, April 2011. Stephen Law. Pages 129-151) EVIDENCE, MIRACLES AND THE EXISTENCE OF JESUS Stephen Law Abstract The vast majority of Biblical historians believe there is evidence sufficient to place Jesus’ existence beyond reasonable doubt. Many believe the New Testament documents alone suffice firmly to establish Jesus as an actual, historical figure. I question these views. In particular, I argue (i) that the three most popular criteria by which various non-miraculous New Testament claims made about Jesus are supposedly corroborated are not sufficient, either singly or jointly, to place his existence beyond reasonable doubt, and (ii) that a prima facie plausible principle concerning how evidence should be assessed – a principle I call the contamination principle – entails that, given the large proportion of uncorroborated miracle claims made about Jesus in the New Testament documents, we should, in the absence of indepen...
159 comments
Read more

Sye - nowhere to run to, baby.

SYE RESPONDS TO MY PRECEEDING POST: @ Stephen, Alright, how about we go this way. Since you, and perhaps many of your cohorts are philosphically trained, why don't you show me how it's done. It would appear that your biggest problem with my proof is that you feel that the argument I offer "The impossibility of the contrary," for the truth of my premise that "God is the necessary precondition for intelligibiliy," is not, in fact, an argument. Alright in the format you are requesting of me: premise 1 premise 2 premise 3 (...) premise n Therefore: conclusion please prove to me, that "The impossibility of the contrary" is not an argument. Cheers, Sye MY RESPONSE TO SYE: Sye You misunderstand. I am not saying you don't have an argument. Maybe you do (though of course I don't think you have a good argument - for there are not the resources on the page behind the continue button to support your conclusion). I am saying I cannot figure out what th...
153 comments
Read more

The Evil God Challenge and the "classical" theist's response

On another blog, FideCogitActio, some theists of a "classical" stripe (that's to say, like Brian Davies, Edward Feser) are criticisng the Evil God Challenge (or I suppose, trying to show how it can be met, or sidestepped). The main post includes this: In book I, chapter 39 , Aquinas argues that “there cannot be evil in God” (in Deo non potest esse malum). Atheists like Law must face the fact that, if the words are to retain any sense, “God” simply cannot be “evil”. As my comments in the thread at Feser’s blog aimed to show, despite how much he mocks “the privation theory of evil,” Law himself cannot escape its logic: his entire argument requires that the world ought to appear less evil if it is to be taken as evidence of a good God. Even though he spurns the idea that evil is a privation of good, his account of an evil world is parasitic on a good ideal; this is no surprise, though, since all evil is parasitic on good ( SCG I, 11 ). Based on the conclusions of se...
446 comments
Read more