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HEALING POWERS OF THE MIND? event 20th October

CFI UK and Conway Hall present


Chris French, Andy Lewis, Mike Heap, Serena Roney-Dougal

Do some people have the power to heal others by psychic means? Would medicine benefit by being more aware of our “spiritual” dimension? Where do psychic and spiritual approaches to medicine end and quackery begin? Does hypnosis work, and if so, how? Does meditation offer real benefits – and if so, what are they?

Saturday, 20th October 2012

Conway Hall
25 Red Lion Square
London WC1R 4RL

11am-4pm (10.30am registration)

£10 (£5 students concessions). Free entry for Friends of CFI UK.

Tickets from the BHA website now or on the door.


11am-12.00 Chris French (Professor of Anomolistic Psychology at Goldsmiths) on psychic healing

12.00-1pm Serena Roney-Dougal (parapsychologist and Director of the Psi Research Centre) "Is long-term meditation related to psychic awareness?"

2-3pm Michael Heap (Clinical and forensic psychologist working in Sheffield who has published widely on hypnosis in scientific journals and books and has taught and lectured on the subject throughout Europe and North America.) ‘Hypnosis: Suggestion or Trance?’ 

3-4pm Andy Lewis (Quackometer) on “Anthroposophy and Spiritual Science”.

Introduced by Stephen Law (Provost of CFI UK)



Cornell Anthony said…
Healing powers of the mind....hmmm

Wo, so there are magical healing powers of the mind, but Christians are irrational to believe that the resurrection occured?
Cornell Anthony said…
This comment has been removed by the author.
Cornell Anthony said…
I also think it's funny that people actually believe in Palm readings, Tarot Cards, Curses, Astrology, paranormal, and Luck pertaining to sports teams (such as if I wear one sock it will help my team win).

Well considering that Theism doesn't necessarily imply any of these absurdies up above all I have to say is 'whew' though if a non-theist believes in these, then what? All and all it is interesting how I never see your skeptical antenna raised up on these issues I outlined above. In fact have you ever mentioned them?

If you did then I will recall my statement, if you didn't then I'm going to have to say you are showing a bit of bias here.

Now I know you are just introducing all this on Oct 20th, but I'd be very interested on your take concerning whether or not we have pyschic powers that can heal.
Stephen Law said…
Hi Corny, no of course I don't. check this out...
Stephen Law said…
Or my latest post
Kate Joslin said…
I'll be sorry to miss this on Saturday. Particularly would be interested in hearing scepticism on Hypnosis.

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